Zonal in-vehicle networks ship Ethernet, MACsec, and TSN, but treat the network itself as trusted: once configured at the factory, there is no standardized runtime way to easily revoke access, rotate keys, or contain a compromised ECU. Zero Trust Architecture targets exactly that gap, yet existing automotive ZTA proposals bolt on dedicated infrastructure that duplicates the SDN management plane already required to enable SDVs. Thus, ZTA is not yet adopted in the automotive domain, and the question remains: can we do better? We answer this in two steps. Step 1 analyses what Open Alliance TC17~v1.0 MACsec/MKA with pre-shared CAKs already provides in terms of NIST SP~800-207 ZTA tenets. Step 2 adds CORECONF/YANG management as proposed in Open Alliance TC19, maps the SDN Controller and Agents one-to-one onto NIST's PE, PA, and PEP. We then instantiate this with two YANG-based mechanisms: a network-access-control flow and a key-management scheme. The result fully covers five and two partially of the seven tenets with no ZTA-specific infrastructure added.

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