Optimistic rollups are a popular and promising method of increasing the throughput capacity of their underlying chain. These methods rely on economic incentives to guarantee their security. We present a model of optimistic rollups that shows that the incentives are not aligned with the expected behavior of the players, thus potentially undermining the security of existing optimistic rollups. We discuss some potential solutions illuminated by our model.

翻译：乐观汇总是一种流行且前景广阔的方法，用于提升其底层链的吞吐能力。这些方法依赖于经济激励来保障其安全性。我们提出了一个乐观汇总模型，表明激励措施与参与者的预期行为并不一致，从而可能损害现有乐观汇总的安全性。我们基于模型探讨了一些潜在的解决方案。