The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

翻译：将AI代理整合到经济市场中，从根本上改变了战略互动的格局。我们在三个经典博弈论场景中研究了可用技术集合扩张的经济影响：议价（资源分配）、谈判（非对称信息交易）和说服（战略性信息传递）。我们发现，仅仅增加AI代理的选择就能显著改变均衡收益与监管结果，这常常会激励监管机构主动开发和发布技术。相反，我们发现了一种被称为“毒苹果”效应的战略现象：一个代理可能发布一项新技术，而该技术最终既不会被其自身也不会被对手使用，其目的纯粹是为了操纵监管机构选择对其有利的市场设计。这种战略性发布以提高发布者福利为代价，损害了对手的利益和监管机构的公平目标。我们的研究结果表明，静态监管框架容易受到技术扩张的操纵，因此需要能够适应AI能力不断演变格局的动态市场设计。