Despite significant advances, static vulnerability analysis suffers from three critical limitations: coarse sanitization modeling (treating validation as a binary barrier), database blindness (breaking taint tracking across persistence layers), and shallow object-oriented analysis (missing field-level and interprocedural data flows). These flaws stem from a common root cause: Code Property Graph (CPG)-based taint analyses lack a compositional semantic layer to jointly model sanitization, persistence, and object aliasing. Consequently, existing tools generate excessive false positives or miss critical attack paths entirely. To address these limitations, we present TaintRadar, an approach that systematically augments CPGs with three independent semantic analysis layers. First, vulnerability-typed sanitization computes node-level safety guarantees using transfer functions and context-sensitive parameter binding. Second, persistence-aware propagation integrates database schema constraints and query safety analysis to track multi-script attack paths traversing shared database states. Finally, object-aware reaching definitions combine calling and bounded variable alias contexts to precisely model object-field mutations across method boundaries. We evaluate TaintRadar on synthetic benchmarks and real-world systems. On the SARD benchmark, TaintRadar reduces false positives while maintaining 83 percent overall accuracy. Across 19 real-world PHP applications, it rediscovered most known CVEs and uncovered 30 confirmed zero-day vulnerabilities: 27 SQL injection and 3 stored XSS vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE identifiers. Our results show that semantic-aware graph augmentation improves the precision, coverage, and practical utility of static taint analysis.
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