In this paper, we propose a new algebraic attack on stream ciphers. Starting from the well-known attack due to Courtois and Meier, we design an attack especially effective against nonlinear filter generators. We test it on two toy stream ciphers and we show that the level of security of one of stream ciphers submitted to the NIST competition on Lightweight Cryptography, WG-PRNG, is less than that stated before now.

翻译：本文提出一种针对流密码的新代数攻击方法。基于Courtois和Meier提出的著名攻击，我们设计了一种对非线性滤波生成器尤为有效的攻击方案。通过将其应用于两个玩具型流密码进行测试，我们证实提交至NIST轻量级密码竞赛的WG-PRNG流密码的安全级别低于此前声称的水平。