In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner revenue and Dominating-Strategy-Incentive-Compatible (DSIC) for users. However, a positive miner revenue is important in practice to motivate miners. To address this challenge, we consider a Bayesian game setting and relax the DSIC requirement for users to Bayesian-Nash-Incentive-Compatibility (BNIC). In particular, we propose an auxiliary mechanism method that makes connections between BNIC and DSIC mechanisms. With the auxiliary mechanism method, we design a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) based on the multinomial logit (MNL) choice model, and prove that the TFM has both BNIC and collusion-proof properties with an asymptotic constant-factor approximation of optimal miner revenue for i.i.d. bounded valuations. Our result breaks the zero-revenue barrier while preserving truthfulness and collusion-proof properties.

翻译：在区块链系统中，交易费机制的设计对于维持矿工与用户的稳定性及满意度至关重要。最新研究证明，在矿工获得非零收益且用户满足占优策略激励相容（DSIC）条件下，不存在抗共谋机制。然而，实践中矿工的正向收益对激励其参与具有重要意义。为应对这一挑战，我们考虑贝叶斯博弈场景，将用户的DSIC要求放宽为贝叶斯-纳什激励相容（BNIC）。具体而言，我们提出一种辅助机制方法，建立BNIC机制与DSIC机制之间的关联。通过该辅助方法，我们基于多项对数（MNL）选择模型设计了交易费机制（TFM），并证明该机制在独立同分布有界估值条件下，同时满足BNIC与抗共谋性质，且可实现矿工最优收益的渐近常数因子近似。这一结果突破了零收益瓶颈，同时保留了诚实性与抗共谋特性。