We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs. We also show that MEV capture decreases with risk aversion and capital costs. Moreover, when buyers are heterogeneous, MEV capture can be especially low and a single dominant buyer can extract much of the MEV. This adverse effect can be partially mitigated by the presence of a Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) mechanism, which gives ET buyers access to a market of specialized builders, but in practice centralization vectors still persist. With PBS, ETs are concentrated among those with the highest ex-ante MEV extraction ability and lowest cost of capital. We show how it is possible that large investors that are not builders but have substantial advantage in capital cost can come to dominate the ET market.

翻译：我们提出了执行凭证的经济模型，并以此研究以太坊协议从区块构建中捕获MEV的能力。研究表明：当所有购买者具有同质性、风险中性且无资本成本时，执行凭证能够提取全部MEV。同时我们发现，MEV捕获率会随着风险厌恶程度和资本成本的增加而下降。此外，当购买者存在异质性时，MEV捕获率可能显著降低，单个主导性购买者可能提取大部分MEV。这种负面影响可以通过提议者-构建者分离机制得到部分缓解——该机制使执行凭证购买者能够接入专业构建者市场，但实践中中心化风险依然存在。在提议者-构建者分离机制下，执行凭证会集中在具有最高事前MEV提取能力和最低资本成本的参与者手中。我们论证了非构建者身份但拥有显著资本成本优势的大型投资者如何可能主导执行凭证市场。