We study the universal coding under side-channel attacks posed and investigated by Oohama and Santoso (2022). They proposed a theoretical security model for Shannon cipher system under side-channel attacks, where the adversary is not only allowed to collect ciphertexts by eavesdropping the public communication channel, but is also allowed to collect the physical information leaked by the devices where the cipher system is implemented on such as running time, power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, etc. For any distributions of the plain text, any noisy channels through which the adversary observe the corrupted version of the key, and any measurement device used for collecting the physical information, we can derive an achievable rate region for reliability and security such that if we compress the ciphertext with rate within the achievable rate region, then: (1) anyone with secret key will be able to decrypt and decode the ciphertext correctly, but (2) any adversary who obtains the ciphertext and also the side physical information will not be able to obtain any information about the hidden source as long as the leaked physical information is encoded with a rate within the rate region.

翻译：我们研究了Oohama和Santoso（2022）提出并探讨的侧信道攻击下的通用编码问题。他们为侧信道攻击下的香农密码系统提出了一个理论安全模型：攻击者不仅可以通过窃听公共通信信道来收集密文，还可以收集密码系统实现设备泄露的物理信息（如运行时间、功耗、电磁辐射等）。对于任意明文分布、攻击者通过任意噪声信道观测到的密钥受损版本，以及任何用于收集物理信息的测量设备，我们推导出可靠性与安全性的可实现速率区域：若以该速率区域内的速率压缩密文，则（1）任何持有密钥者均可正确解密并译码密文，但（2）只要泄露的物理信息以该速率区域内的速率进行编码，任何获取密文及侧信道物理信息的攻击者均无法获取隐藏源的信息。