We study agents playing a pure coordination game on a large social network. Agents are restricted to coordinate locally, without access to a global communication device, and so different regions of the network will converge to different actions, precluding perfect coordination. We show that the extent of this inefficiency depends on the network geometry: on some networks, near-perfect efficiency is achievable, while on others welfare is strictly bounded away from the optimum. We provide a geometric condition on the network structure that characterizes when near-efficiency is attainable. On networks in which it is unattainable, our results more generally preclude high correlations between outcomes in a large spectrum of dynamic games.

翻译：本研究探讨了在大型社交网络上进行纯协调博弈的智能体行为。智能体仅限于局部协调，无法使用全局通信设备，因此网络的不同区域将收敛至不同行动，从而无法实现完美协调。我们证明这种低效程度取决于网络几何结构：在某些网络中可实现接近完美的效率，而在另一些网络中福利水平严格偏离最优值。我们提出了一个网络结构的几何条件，用以刻画接近高效状态何时可达。在无法实现该条件的网络中，我们的研究结果更广泛地排除了大量动态博弈结果间存在高度相关性的可能性。