We consider a housing market model with limited externalities where agents care both about their own consumption via demand preferences and about the agent who receives their endowment via supply preferences (we extend the associated lexicographic preference domains introduced in Klaus and Meo, 2023). If preferences are demand lexicographic, then our model extends the classical Shapley-Scarf housing market (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences model. Our main result is a characterization of the corresponding top trading cycles (TTC) rule by individual rationality, pair efficiency, and strategy-proofness (Theorem 1), which extends that of Ekici (2024) from classical Shapley-Scarf housing markets with strict preferences to our model. Two further characterizations are immediately obtained by strengthening pair efficiency to either Pareto efficiency or pairwise stability (Corollaries 1 and 2). Finally, we show that as soon as we extend the preference domain to include demand lexicographic as well as supply lexicographic preferences (e.g., when preferences are separable), no rule satisfying individual rationality, pair efficiency, and strategy-proofness exists (Theorem 2).

翻译：我们考虑一个具有有限外部性的住房市场模型，其中代理人既通过需求偏好关心自身的消费，也通过供给偏好关心获得其禀赋的代理人（我们扩展了Klaus和Meo（2023）引入的相关词典序偏好域）。若偏好是需求词典序的，则我们的模型扩展了具有严格偏好的经典Shapley-Scarf住房市场模型（Shapley和Scarf，1974）。我们的主要结果是通过个体理性、配对效率和策略证明性（定理1）对相应的最高交易循环规则进行刻画，这将Ekici（2024）从具有严格偏好的经典Shapley-Scarf住房市场到我们模型的刻画进行了扩展。通过将配对效率强化为帕累托效率或配对稳定性，可立即得到两个进一步的刻画（推论1和2）。最后，我们证明一旦将偏好域扩展至同时包含需求词典序和供给词典序偏好（例如当偏好可分离时），则不存在满足个体理性、配对效率和策略证明性的规则（定理2）。