We study a portioning setting in which a public resource such as time or money is to be divided among a given set of candidates, and each agent proposes a division of the resource. We consider two families of aggregation rules for this setting - those based on coordinate-wise aggregation and those that optimize some notion of welfare - as well as the recently proposed Independent Markets mechanism. We provide a detailed analysis of these rules from an axiomatic perspective, both for classic axioms, such as strategyproofness and Pareto optimality, and for novel axioms, which aim to capture proportionality in this setting. Our results indicate that a simple rule that computes the average of all proposals satisfies many of our axioms, including some that are violated by more sophisticated rules.

翻译：我们研究一种资源分配场景，其中公共资源（如时间或资金）需分配给一组候选对象，每位参与者提出一种资源分配方案。针对该场景，我们考虑两类聚合规则——基于坐标聚合的规则与优化某种福利指标的规则——以及近期提出的独立市场机制。我们从公理化角度对这些规则进行了详细分析，既涵盖策略证明性、帕累托最优性等经典公理，也包含旨在刻画该场景中比例性的新型公理。研究结果表明，计算所有提案平均值的简单规则能够满足我们多项公理，其中包括某些更为复杂的规则所违反的公理。