Technologies such as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) depend on the availability of infrastructure. We define the Infrastructure Provider (InP) as the actor responsible for deploying and maintaining this infrastructure, while Service Providers (SPs) operate applications over it to serve end users and earn revenues. Deploying such infrastructure requires however a significant investment, and the InP may be reluctant to bear it alone. We propose co-investment to overcome this barrier, allowing players, the InP and multiple SPs, to share costs and revenues. However, committing to a co-investment over a long period may be too constraining for players: in an unforeseeable future, players may realize that they could make more profit outside the co-investment (such a profit is called opportunity cost). For this reason, we propose a scheme, based on coalitional game theory, which is dynamic in terms of (i)allowing players to join, remain in, or leave the co-investment, (ii) adjusting the infrastructure capacity and resource sharing over time. We propose a method to compute entry fees and exit penalties in order to appropriately compensate players remaining in the co-investment. We numerically show that our dynamic scheme encourages player participation and increases profit (in case of high opportunity cost).

翻译：移动边缘计算（MEC）等技术的可用性依赖于基础设施。我们将基础设施提供商（InP）定义为负责部署和维护该基础设施的参与者，而服务提供商（SPs）在其上运行应用程序以服务最终用户并获取收入。然而，部署此类基础设施需要大量投资，InP可能不愿独自承担。我们提出共同投资以克服这一障碍，允许参与者（InP和多个SPs）共享成本和收入。但是，长期承诺参与共同投资对参与者而言可能约束过强：在不可预见的未来，参与者可能意识到他们在共同投资之外能获得更多利润（此类利润称为机会成本）。因此，我们提出一种基于联盟博弈理论的方案，该方案在以下方面具有动态性：（i）允许参与者加入、留在或离开共同投资，（ii）随时间调整基础设施容量和资源共享。我们提出一种计算入场费和退出罚金的方法，以适当补偿留在共同投资中的参与者。我们通过数值模拟表明，我们的动态方案鼓励了参与者参与并提高了利润（在高机会成本情况下）。