A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his own preference. The principal can conduct a test to learn about the state and then communicate with the agent, but has limited commitment, as she may misreport her findings. We show that limited commitment makes binary tests optimal. Moreover, when players' preferences are positively aligned, the optimal test is a threshold test. When their preferences are negatively aligned, the optimal test is either an interval test or a tail test, depending on the agent's relative risk attitude. Additionally, the principal can benefit from screening the agent through a menu of tests, which admits a simple structure regardless of the complexity of the agent's type space.

翻译：委托人与代理人可在一致同意下启动项目。双方从项目中获得的个人收益取决于潜在状态，且代理人私下知晓自身偏好。委托人可通过测试了解状态后与代理人沟通，但其承诺能力有限，可能误报发现。我们证明有限承诺使二元测试成为最优选择。此外，当参与者的偏好正向对齐时，最优测试为阈值测试；当偏好负向对齐时，根据代理人的相对风险态度，最优测试为区间测试或尾部测试。委托人还可通过测试菜单筛选代理人获益，该菜单结构简单，不受代理人类型空间复杂性的影响。