We present a modular hierarchy of private delegated quantum computation protocols tailored to user-level and industry-level settings and parameterized by the quantum resources available to the client. For each protocol, we specify the client capabilities, delegated gate set, adversarial model, transcript leakage and resulting privacy claims. The hierarchy separates QOTP state privacy under declared leakage from leakage-dependent transcript-level angle ambiguity, compiler- and leakage-function-dependent structural privacy, and output privacy, clarifies when public Clifford operations can be evaluated on quantum-one-time-pad encrypted data by classical key updates, and identifies where non-Clifford privacy, non-collusion or additional primitives are required. The classical-client branch uses a persistent common-node, matching-hidden split-QOTP together with shuffled finite-grid $r$-share sign-randomized angle sharing to obtain leakage-relative state hiding under an explicit $ε_{\mathrm{key}}$ key-hiding condition and transcript-level unlinkability under hidden-matching assumptions under an explicit non-total-collusion and leakage model. The angle-sharing primitives provide transcript ambiguity under explicit leakage assumptions, not universal blindness. The trap-based layer provides detection under stated assumptions, but it is not a stand-alone malicious-security proof.

翻译：我们提出了一种模块化分层的私有委托量子计算协议体系，专门针对用户级和产业级场景设计，并以客户端可用的量子资源为参数化依据。针对每个协议，我们明确了客户端能力、委托门集、对抗模型、通信记录泄露及由此产生的隐私声明。该体系将量子一次性填充（QOTP）状态隐私（在声明泄露条件下）与依赖泄露的通信记录级角度模糊性、编译器及泄露函数相关结构性隐私、以及输出隐私相分离；阐明了在何种情况下，可通过经典密钥更新在量子一次性填充加密数据上评估公开克利福德（Clifford）操作；并指出非克利福德（non-Clifford）隐私、非共谋条件或额外原语在何处是必需的。经典客户端分支采用持久公共节点、匹配隐藏分离式量子一次性填充（split-QOTP）以及混洗有限网格$r$份额符号随机化角度共享方案，在显式密钥隐藏条件$\varepsilon_{\mathrm{key}}$下实现与泄露相关的状态隐藏，并在显式非完全共谋与泄露模型下，基于隐藏匹配假设实现通信记录级不可链接性。角度共享原语提供在显式泄露假设下的通信记录模糊性，而非通用盲化能力。基于陷阱的层次结构在既定假设下提供检测能力，但并非独立的恶意安全性证明。