Generative AI can improve immediate performance but may erode the human skills required for future work. We study a model in which individuals tend to imitate successful peers, while their independent skills grow with practice and erode with reliance on AI. Because each agent's skill reflects their history, non-users and AI users develop different skill distributions, which we derive exactly. Skill erosion can produce bistability and hysteresis between a low-adoption, high-skill state and a high-adoption, low-skill state. When agents rarely change behaviour at random, the two transitions are asymmetric. A single AI user spreads through a population of experts only if AI-assisted work earns more than expert work, whatever the timescale of skill adaptation. A single non-user, by contrast, can lead an AI-dependent population back to independent work only if they regain enough skill before returning to AI, which becomes easier the more persistent behaviours are. As AI improves, adoption can jump abruptly, and a sufficiently long increase in its benefit, such as a period of low prices, can leave a population relying on AI after the benefit has returned to its initial value. Skill erosion thus creates a history-dependent switching cost that can make widespread AI adoption difficult to reverse.

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