Modern democracies face an existential crisis of waning public trust in election results. While End-to-End Verifiable (E2E-V) voting systems promise mathematically secure elections, their reliance on complex cryptography creates a ``black box'' that forces blind trust in opaque software or external experts, ultimately failing to build genuine public confidence. To solve this, we introduce the concept of Software-Free Verification (SFV) -- a standard requiring that voters can independently verify election integrity without relying on any software. We propose a practical, non-cryptographic in-booth voting scheme that achieves SFV for national-scale elections. Our approach leverages a public bulletin board of randomized (Pseudonym, Candidate) pairs, where a mechanically generated pseudonym is hidden among real decoy votes on a physical receipt. Our scheme empowers citizens to audit the election using only basic arithmetic via a hierarchical Public Ledger, while anchoring the overall digital tally to physical evidence and Risk-Limiting Audits (RLAs) to guarantee systemic integrity. The result is a system that bridges the gap between mathematical security and public transparency, offering a viable blueprint for restoring trust in democratic infrastructure.

翻译：现代民主正面临公众对选举结果信任度下降的生存危机。尽管端到端可验证（E2E-V）投票系统承诺提供数学上安全的选举，但其对复杂密码学的依赖形成了一个“黑箱”，迫使选民盲目信任不透明的软件或外部专家，最终无法建立真正的公众信任。为解决这一问题，我们提出了“无需软件验证”（SFV）概念——该标准要求选民无需依赖任何软件即可独立验证选举的完整性。我们提出了一种实用的、非加密的室内投票方案，可在国家层面选举中实现SFV。该方法利用一个随机化（假名，候选人）对的公共公告板，其中通过机械方式生成的假名被隐藏在物理收据上的真实诱饵投票中。我们的方案使公民能够通过分层公共账本仅使用基础算术来审计选举，同时将整体数字计票锚定于物理证据和风险限制审计（RLA），以确保系统完整性。最终成果是一个弥合数学安全性与公众透明度之间鸿沟的系统，为恢复民主基础设施的信任提供了切实可行的蓝图。