We study strategic space- and time-constrained cooperation between two self-interested agents through the Intermittent Strategic Cooperation-Based Two-Agent Path Planning (IC2PP) problem, a shortest-path game on graphs in which agents navigate toward individual targets while optionally cooperating at specific nodes to reduce their own travel times. Although such cooperation can strictly benefit both agents, it is strategically fragile: agents may deviate at any point along their paths. Modeled as a 2-player game, we characterize the structure of Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) joint strategies in IC2PP, and show that stable cooperation must follow a highly constrained form. We further prove that at least one PNE exists in every instance of IC2PP, and present a polynomial-time algorithm for enumerating all relevant PNEs. When multiple equilibria arise, we study coordination mechanisms based on bargaining-theoretic selection concepts and empirically compare equilibrium outcomes in terms of individual travel times and social welfare.

翻译：我们通过间歇性战略合作双主体路径规划（IC2PP）问题研究两个自利主体之间受时空约束的战略合作。该问题是一个基于图的最短路径博弈，其中主体在朝向各自目标移动的同时，可选择在某些节点上进行合作以缩短自身行程时间。尽管此类合作能严格使双方受益，但战略上具有脆弱性：主体可能在其路径上的任意点偏离合作。本文将该问题建模为双人博弈，刻画了IC2PP中纯纳什均衡（PNE）联合策略的结构，并证明稳定的合作必须遵循高度受限的形式。我们进一步证明在IC2PP的每个实例中至少存在一个PNE，并给出一个多项式时间算法用于枚举所有相关PNE。当存在多个均衡时，我们研究基于谈判理论选择概念的协调机制，并基于个体行程时间和社会福利对均衡结果进行实证比较。