This paper presents a new method for quantum identity authentication (QIA) protocols. The logic of classical zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) due to Schnorr is applied in quantum circuits and algorithms. This novel approach gives an exact way with which a prover $P$ can prove they know some secret by encapsulating it in a quantum state before sending to a verifier $V$ by means of a quantum channel - allowing for a ZKP wherein an eavesdropper or manipulation can be detected with a fail-safe design. This is achieved by moving away from the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem towards the hardness of estimating quantum states. This paper presents a method with which this can be achieved and some bounds for the security of the protocol provided. With the anticipated advent of a `quantum internet', such protocols and ideas may soon have utility and execution in the real world.

翻译：本文提出了一种量子身份认证协议的新方法。将Schnorr提出的经典零知识证明逻辑应用于量子电路与算法中。该创新方法提供了一种精确方式：证明者P可将某一秘密封装到量子态中，再通过量子信道发送给验证者V，从而构建零知识证明协议——该协议具备故障安全设计，可检测窃听或篡改行为。这一实现通过将安全性从离散对数问题的困难性转向量子态估计的困难性完成。本文阐述了实现该协议的具体方法，并给出了协议安全性的若干边界条件。随着"量子互联网"的预期到来，此类协议与理念或将在现实世界中具备实用性与可执行性。