In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution concepts. We study its theoretical properties and show that it provides sharp predictions, exists in most games as well as in a broad new class of economic environments, admits standard epistemic and dynamic foundations, and is empirically falsifiable.

翻译：在满意均衡中，每个参与者 $i$ 根据其他参与者的行动，选择其最优先的 $k_i$ 个行动之一。我们的概念统一了有限理性模型，并得出了与经典解概念不同的预测。我们研究其理论性质，表明它能提供清晰的预测，在大多数博弈以及广泛的新型经济环境中存在，具有标准认知与动态基础，并且在经验上可证伪。