Each period, two players bargain over a unit of surplus. Each player chooses between remaining flexible and committing to a take-it-or-leave-it offer at a cost. If players' committed demands are incompatible, then the current-period surplus is destroyed in the conflict. When both players are flexible, the surplus is split according to the status quo, which is the division in the last period where there was no conflict. We show that when players are patient and the cost of commitment is small, there exist a class of symmetric Markov Perfect equilibria that are asymptotically efficient and renegotiation proof, in which players commit to fair demands in almost all periods.

翻译：在每一时期，两位参与者就单位剩余进行谈判。每位参与者需在保持灵活性与承担成本作出"接受或放弃"式承诺之间作出选择。若双方承诺要求互不相容，则当期剩余将在冲突中被销毁。当双方均保持灵活时，剩余将根据现状（即最近无冲突时期达成的分配方案）进行分割。研究表明：当参与者具备足够耐心且承诺成本较小时，存在一类对称马尔可夫完美均衡，其具有渐进效率与重谈判证明特性，在该均衡中参与者几乎在所有时期都会承诺公平要求。