We propose and analyze a business model for 5G operators. Each operator is entitled to a share of a network operated by an Infrastructure Provider (InP) and use network slicing mechanisms to request network resources as needed for service provision. The network operators become Network Slice Tenants (NSTs). The InP performs the resource allocation based on a vector of weights chosen strategically by each NST. The weights distribute the NST's share of resources between its subscribers in each cell. We propose a strategy profile in which the NST chooses weights equal to the product of its share by the ratio between the total number of subscribers in the cell and the total number of subscribers in the network. We characterize the proposed solution in terms of subscription ratios and fractions of subscribers, for different cell capacities and user sensitivities. The proposed solution provides the exact values for the Nash equilibrium if the cells are homogeneous in terms of normalized capacity, which is a measure of the total amount of resources available in the cell. Otherwise, if the cells are heterogeneous, it provides an accurate approximation. We quantify the deviation from the equilibrium and conclude that it is highly accurate.

翻译：本文提出并分析了一种面向5G运营商的商业模式。每个运营商拥有由基础设施提供商（InP）运营网络的一部分份额，并利用网络切片机制按需申请服务供给所需的网络资源。网络运营商由此成为网络切片租户（NST）。InP根据每个NST战略选择的权重向量进行资源分配，这些权重将NST的资源份额在其各基站内的用户间进行分配。我们提出一种策略方案：NST选择的权重等于其份额乘以基站内总用户数与全网总用户数之比的乘积。针对不同基站容量和用户敏感度，我们从订阅比例和用户份额的角度对所提方案进行特征刻画。若基站在归一化容量（表征基站内可用资源总量的度量）方面具有同质性，该方案可给出纳什均衡的精确值；若基站存在异质性，则提供高精度近似解。我们量化了与均衡状态的偏差，并证明该方案具有极高的准确性。