In many applications, ads are displayed together with the prices, so as to provide a direct comparison among similar products or services. The price-displaying feature not only influences the consumers' decisions, but also affects the advertisers' bidding behaviors. In this paper, we study ad auctions with display prices from the perspective of mechanism design, in which advertisers are asked to submit both the costs and prices of their products. We provide a characterization for all incentive compatible auctions with display prices, and use it to design auctions under two scenarios. In the former scenario, the display prices are assumed to be exogenously determined. For this setting, we derive the welfare-maximizing and revenue-maximizing auctions for any realization of the price profile. In the latter, advertisers are allowed to strategize display prices in their own interests. We investigate two families of allocation policies within the scenario and identify the equilibrium prices accordingly. Our results reveal that the display prices do affect the design of ad auctions and the platform can leverage such information to optimize the performance of ad delivery.

翻译：在众多应用场景中，广告与价格信息一同展示，以便为同类产品或服务提供直接比较。价格展示功能不仅影响消费者的决策，也会改变广告主的竞价行为。本文从机制设计视角研究带有显示价格的广告拍卖，其中广告主需同时提交其产品的成本与价格。我们给出了所有激励相容的显示价格广告拍卖的特征刻画，并据此设计了两类场景下的拍卖。在前一场景中，假设显示价格是外生给定的，针对该设定，我们推导了任意价格分布下实现社会福利最大化和收益最大化的拍卖机制。在后一场景中，广告主可出于自身利益策略性地设定显示价格，我们研究了该场景下的两类分配策略，并据此识别了相应的均衡价格。研究结果表明，显示价格确实会影响广告拍卖的设计，平台可借助此类信息优化广告投放效果。