Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a promising tool for automated vulnerability detection, yet their effectiveness on web-specific vulnerabilities remains to be explored. This work benchmarks six frontier (Claude Opus 4.6, Codex GPT-5.4, Gemini 3.1-pro-preview) and open-weight models (Qwen 3.5, Qwen 3 Coder Next, MiniMax M2.5) on their ability to detect real-world web vulnerabilities using static analysis in WordPress plugins, including SQL injection, stored cross-site scripting, path traversal, and remote code execution. Using five prompt designs of varying structure, scope, and complexity across three experiment iterations, we aim to answer how model and prompt choice affects vulnerability detection. Our results show that all models are capable of detecting valid security issues, but the detection rate varies depending on the model and prompt. For example, Claude Opus 4.6 achieved the highest web vulnerability detection rate (63%), while open-weight MiniMax M2.5 performs on par with other frontier models (48%), and self-hosted Qwen 3.5 only achieved 35%. We show that scoped prompts that narrow the vulnerability scope outperform open-ended ones, whereas the prompt complexity has little impact. Surprisingly, no model achieved full reporting consistency across three experiment iterations, with some as low as 50%. Our experiments demonstrate the opportunities and limits of LLM-based vulnerability detection, as no model correctly identified one baseline vulnerability in one of the plugins. Additionally, we derive practical lessons learned for security practitioners and publish all code and data to support future research.

翻译：暂无翻译