In the last few years several papers investigated selfish mine attacks, most of which assumed that every miner that is not part of the selfish mine pool will continue to mine honestly. However, in reality, remaining honest is not always incentivized, particularly when another pool is employing selfish mining or other deviant strategies. In this work we explore the scenario in which a large enough pool capitalises on another selfish pool to gain 100\% of the profit and commit double spending attacks. We show that this counterstrategy can effectively counter any deviant strategy, and that even the possibility of it discourages other pools from implementing deviant strategies.

翻译：过去几年中，多篇论文研究了自私挖矿攻击，其中大多数假设未参与自私矿池的矿工将继续诚实挖矿。然而在现实中，保持诚实并不总是受到激励，尤其是当另一矿池采用自私挖矿或其他偏离策略时。本研究探索了一种场景：规模足够大的矿池利用另一个自私矿池来获取100%的利润并实施双重花费攻击。我们证明，这种反制策略能有效对抗任何偏离策略，且即便仅存在这种可能性，也会阻止其他矿池实施偏离策略。