Based on principal-agent theory and optimal contract theory, companies use the method of increasing executives' shareholding to stimulate collaborative innovation. However, from the aspect of agency costs between management and shareholders (i.e. the first type) and between major shareholders and minority shareholders (i.e. the second type), the interests of management, shareholders and creditors will be unbalanced with the change of the marginal utility of executive equity incentives.In order to establish the correlation between the proportion of shares held by executives and investments in corporate innovation, we have chosen a range of publicly listed companies within China's A-share market as the focus of our study. Employing a multi-variable linear regression model, we aim to analyze this relationship thoroughly.The following models were developed: (1) the impact model of executive shareholding on corporate innovation investment; (2) the impact model of executive shareholding on two types of agency costs; (3)The model is employed to examine the mediating influence of the two categories of agency costs. Following both correlation and regression analyses, the findings confirm a meaningful and positive correlation between executives' shareholding and the augmentation of corporate innovation investments. Additionally, the results indicate that executive shareholding contributes to the reduction of the first type of agency cost, thereby fostering corporate innovation investment. However, simultaneously, it leads to an escalation in the second type of agency cost, thus impeding corporate innovation investment.

翻译：基于委托代理理论与最优契约理论，企业通过提高高管持股比例来激发协同创新。然而，从管理层与股东之间（第一类）以及大股东与中小股东之间（第二类）的代理成本角度分析，高管股权激励边际效用的变化将导致管理层、股东与债权人之间的利益失衡。为建立高管持股比例与企业创新投资之间的关联性，本研究选取中国A股市场上市公司为研究对象，运用多元线性回归模型深入分析这一关系。构建了以下模型：（1）高管持股对企业创新投资的影响模型；（2）高管持股对两类代理成本的影响模型；（3）考察两类代理成本中介效应的模型。经相关性分析与回归分析，结果证实高管持股与企业创新投资增加之间存在显著正相关关系。此外，研究发现高管持股有助于降低第一类代理成本，从而促进企业创新投资；但与此同时，该机制会导致第二类代理成本上升，进而抑制企业创新投资。