The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics assumes that welfare-bearing agents are autonomous and implicitly relies on a binary distinction between autonomy and instrumentality. Welfare subjects are those who have autonomy and therefore the capacity to choose and enter into utility comparisons, while everything else does not. In post-AGI economies this presupposition becomes nontrivial because artificial systems may exhibit varying degrees of autonomy, functioning as tools, delegates, strategic market actors, manipulators of choice environments, or possible welfare subjects. We argue that the theorem ought to be subject to an autonomy qualification where the impact of these changes in autonomy assumptions is incorporated. Using a minimal general-equilibrium model with autonomy-conditioned welfare, welfare-status assignment, delegation accounting, and verification institutions, we set out conditions for which autonomy-complete competitive equilibrium is autonomy-Pareto efficient. The classical theorem is recovered as the low-autonomy limit.

翻译：福利经济学第一基本定理假设福利承载主体是自主的，并隐含依赖于自治与工具性之间的二元区分。福利主体是那些拥有自治权，因而能够做出选择并进入效用比较的主体，而其他一切则不具备。在后AGI时代的经济中，这一预设变得不再平凡，因为人工系统可能展现出不同程度的自治，扮演工具、代表、战略市场参与者、选择环境操纵者或可能的福利主体等角色。我们认为，该定理应当受到一种自治限定，其中自治假设变化的影响被纳入考虑。通过使用一个带有自治条件福利、福利状态分配、代表会计和验证机构的最小一般均衡模型，我们设定了自治完备竞争均衡是自治帕累托有效的条件。经典定理被恢复为低自治极限情况。