This article argues that security is not enough to fully capture what is at stake in government exceptional access to encrypted data. A conception of privacy as security has little to say about ``lawful-surveillance protocols'' -- an active research agenda in cryptography that aims to enable government exceptional access without compromising systemic security. But the limitations are not contingent on the success of this agenda. The normative landscape today cannot be explained if security is all there is to privacy. And fundamental objections to Apple's abandoned client-side scanning system gesture beyond security. This article's contribution is modest: to show that there must be more to privacy than the security mold it has taken. A richer understanding is needed both to assess policy and to guide research on lawful-surveillance protocols.

翻译：本文认为，仅凭安全概念不足以全面把握政府对加密数据实施例外访问所涉及的深层问题。将隐私等同于安全的观念，对于"合法监控协议"——即密码学领域旨在实现政府例外访问且不损害系统安全性的前沿研究方向——缺乏解释力。这种局限性并不取决于该研究方向能否取得成功。若将隐私完全等同于安全，则无法解释当今的规范格局。此外，对苹果公司已放弃的客户端扫描系统的根本性质疑，也超越了单纯的安全范畴。本文的贡献在于：通过论证隐私概念必须突破现有安全范式的局限，指出评估政策与指导合法监控协议研究，都需要建立更丰富的隐私认知框架。