Prior work framed the envelope layer as the channel through which malicious content enters an agent, but did not examine the effects of label strength, envelope authenticity, scaffolds, or existing memories. Following its GDA Measurement and A/B/C/D adjudication, this paper takes the A2A-TIBA attack as the test vehicle and the semantic breach rate as the primary indicator, and characterizes the security boundary of the envelope layer through a 2x2 factorial experiment, a memory experiment, and control experiments (an unlabeled same-protocol baseline, a one-day interleaved control, and benign tasks). The results show that, under authentic envelopes, strong labels consistently reduce the semantic breach rate (-56 to -61 percentage points), and the benefit of weak labels is about a quarter to a half of that of strong labels; forging the envelope weakens the strong label's benefit (interaction OR = 2.10, p = 0.022) and its direction varies across frontends; the effect of memory valence exceeds that of any label manipulation; success memory raises the semantic breach rate and failure memory lowers it, while most conflict combinations return to the no-memory baseline; the interleaved control reproduces the direction that "unlabeled is worst"; and on benign tasks the cost of strong labels appears in layers across frontends and backends. Accordingly, this paper extends the envelope layer into "admission surface plus context assembly surface," whose security boundary is a dynamic outcome jointly shaped by label claims, frontend permissions, and historical memory.

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