The prevailing discourse around AI ethics lacks the language and formalism necessary to capture the diverse ethical concerns that emerge when AI systems interact with individuals. Drawing on Sen and Nussbaum's capability approach, we present a framework formalizing a network of ethical concepts and entitlements necessary for AI systems to confer meaningful benefit or assistance to stakeholders. Such systems enhance stakeholders' ability to advance their life plans and well-being while upholding their fundamental rights. We characterize two necessary conditions for morally permissible interactions between AI systems and those impacted by their functioning, and two sufficient conditions for realizing the ideal of meaningful benefit. We then contrast this ideal with several salient failure modes, namely, forms of social interactions that constitute unjustified paternalism, coercion, deception, exploitation and domination. The proliferation of incidents involving AI in high-stakes domains underscores the gravity of these issues and the imperative to take an ethics-led approach to AI systems from their inception.

翻译：当前围绕人工智能伦理的主流论述缺乏必要的语言和形式化体系，难以捕捉AI系统与个体互动时产生的多样化伦理关切。借鉴森和努斯鲍姆的能力路径，我们提出一个形式化框架，系统构建了AI系统为利益相关者提供实质性利益或帮助所必需的伦理概念网络与应享权利体系。此类系统能增强利益相关者推进人生规划、增进福祉的能力，同时维护其基本权利。我们界定了AI系统与受其影响者之间道德上可允许互动的两个必要条件，以及实现有意义利益理想的两个充分条件。随后将这一理想与若干显著失效模式进行对比——即构成不正当家长主义、胁迫、欺骗、剥削与支配的社会互动形式。高利害领域涉及AI的事件频发，凸显了这些问题的严重性，以及从AI系统设计之初便采取伦理主导路径的紧迫性。