When some resources are to be distributed among a set of agents following egalitarian social welfare, the goal is to maximize the utility of the agent whose utility turns out to be minimal. In this context, agents can have an incentive to lie about their actual preferences, so that more valuable resources are assigned to them. In this paper we analyze this situation, and we present a practical study where genetic algorithms are used to assess the benefits of lying under different situations.

翻译：当需要按照平等社会福利原则将某些资源分配给一组智能体时，目标在于最大化最终效用最低的智能体的效用值。在此背景下，智能体可能通过谎报真实偏好来获取更有价值的资源分配。本文分析了这一情境，并通过遗传算法在不同场景下评估谎报行为带来的实际收益进行了实证研究。