Competing firms that share a population of risky customers face a decentralized risk detection problem in which each firm holds fragmentary information whose aggregation would generate social value, but private incentives impede truthful sharing. We develop a dynamic mechanism design framework for this setting and identify three strategic frictions that distinguish it from classical mechanism design with decentralized information: compliance moral hazard, adversarial adaptation, and information destruction through intervention. A temporal value assignment (TVA) mechanism credits firms using a strictly proper scoring rule applied to discounted verified outcomes; under stated assumptions, TVA implements truthful posterior reporting as a Bayes--Nash equilibrium (uniquely optimal at each edge in large federations, with $O(1/m)$ shading in finite systems). A network Shapley characterization shows that under edge-additive coalition value, each firm's marginal contribution is proportional to its weighted cross-firm interaction degree, yielding a sharp prescription for coalition design that prioritizes inter-firm volume over firm size. Embedding TVA in a model of competition among firms, we establish a welfare ordering across four regulatory regimes (autarky, voluntary federation, mandated full sharing, TVA) and identify conditions under which information-sharing mandates without compatible incentive design reduce welfare below autarky: a ``backfiring mandate.'' We illustrate the framework on a 1.4M-transaction synthetic anti-money-laundering benchmark; the same machinery extends to platform fraud, cybersecurity threat intelligence, and supply chain risk detection.

翻译：共享同质风险客户群体的竞争性企业面临一个去中心化风险检测问题，其中每个企业持有碎片化信息，这些信息的聚合能够产生社会价值，但私人激励阻碍了真实分享。我们为此场景开发了一个动态机制设计框架，并识别出三种将其与经典去中心化信息机制设计区分开来的战略性摩擦：合规道德风险、对抗性适应以及干预导致的信息破坏。一种时间价值分配（TVA）机制通过采用严格恰当评分规则对贴现后的已验证结果进行评分，从而为企业分配信用；在既定假设下，TVA将真实后验报告实现为贝叶斯-纳什均衡（在大型联邦中每个边唯一最优，有限系统中存在$O(1/m)$递减效应）。网络沙普利表征表明，在边可加性联盟价值下，每个企业的边际贡献与其加权的跨企业交互度成正比，从而为联盟设计提供了优先考虑企业间流量而非企业规模的精确指导。将TVA嵌入企业间竞争模型后，我们建立了四种监管制度（自给自足、自愿联邦、强制完全共享、TVA）之间的福利排序，并识别出缺乏兼容性激励设计的信息共享强制令将导致福利低于自给自足状态的条件，即“适得其反的强制令”。我们基于一个包含140万笔交易的反洗钱合成基准对框架进行了验证；该机制同样适用于平台欺诈、网络安全威胁情报和供应链风险检测。