Competing firms that share a population of risky customers face a decentralized risk detection problem in which each firm holds fragmentary information whose aggregation would generate social value, but private incentives impede truthful sharing. We develop a dynamic mechanism design framework for this setting and identify three strategic frictions that distinguish it from classical mechanism design with decentralized information: compliance moral hazard, adversarial adaptation, and information destruction through intervention. A temporal value assignment (TVA) mechanism credits firms using a strictly proper scoring rule applied to discounted verified outcomes; under stated assumptions, TVA implements truthful posterior reporting as a Bayes--Nash equilibrium (uniquely optimal at each edge in large federations, with $O(1/m)$ shading in finite systems). A network Shapley characterization shows that under edge-additive coalition value, each firm's marginal contribution is proportional to its weighted cross-firm interaction degree, yielding a sharp prescription for coalition design that prioritizes inter-firm volume over firm size. Embedding TVA in a model of competition among firms, we establish a welfare ordering across four regulatory regimes (autarky, voluntary federation, mandated full sharing, TVA) and identify conditions under which information-sharing mandates without compatible incentive design reduce welfare below autarky: a ``backfiring mandate.'' We illustrate the framework on a 1.4M-transaction synthetic anti-money-laundering benchmark; the same machinery extends to platform fraud, cybersecurity threat intelligence, and supply chain risk detection.

翻译：共享同一高风险客户群体的竞争性企业面临去中心化风险检测问题：每家企业持有碎片化信息，其聚合本可产生社会价值，但私人激励阻碍了真实共享。我们针对该场景构建了一个动态机制设计框架，并识别出三种区别于经典去中心化信息机制设计的战略摩擦：合规道德风险、对抗性适应以及干预导致的信息破坏。一种时间价值分配（TVA）机制通过对贴现后的验证结果应用严格适度评分规则来奖励企业；在给定假设下，TVA将真实后验报告实现为贝叶斯-纳什均衡（在大规模联盟中每边具有唯一最优性，有限系统中存在$O(1/m)$的偏差）。网络夏普利值刻画表明，在边可加联盟价值下，每家企业的边际贡献与其加权跨企业交互度成正比，从而为优先考虑企业间交易量而非企业规模的联盟设计提供了精确准则。将TVA嵌入企业间竞争模型后，我们建立了四种监管体制（自给自足、自愿联盟、强制全面共享、TVA）的福利排序，并识别出条件：若缺乏兼容性激励设计，强制信息披露会降低福利至自给自足水平以下——即"适得其反的强制信息披露"。我们通过包含140万条交易的反洗钱合成基准验证了该框架；该机制同样适用于平台欺诈、网络安全威胁情报与供应链风险检测场景。