Many design companies have gone fabless and rely on external fabrication facilities to produce chips due to increasing cost of semiconductor manufacturing. However, not all of these facilities can be considered trustworthy; some may inject hardware Trojans and jeopardize the security of the system. One common objective of hardware Trojans is to establish a side channel for data leakage. While extensive literature exists on various defensive measures, almost all of them focus on preventing the establishment of side channels, and can be compromised if attackers gain access to the physical chip and can perform reverse engineering between multiple fabrication runs. In this paper, we advance (from theory to practice) RECORD: Randomized Encoding of COmbinational Logic for Resistance to Data Leakage. RECORD is a novel scheme of temporarily randomized encoding for combinational logic that, with the aid of Quilt Packaging, prevents attackers from interpreting the data.

翻译：随着半导体制造成本不断攀升，许多设计公司已转向无晶圆厂模式，依赖外部制造设施生产芯片。然而，并非所有制造设施都值得信赖；部分设施可能植入硬件木马，危及系统安全。硬件木马的常见目标之一是建立数据泄露的侧信道。尽管现有文献提出了多种防御措施，但几乎所有方法都侧重于防止侧信道的建立，且一旦攻击者能够接触物理芯片并在多次制造批次间进行逆向工程，这些防御便可能失效。本文从理论到实践层面推进了RECORD方案：面向数据泄露防护的组合逻辑随机化编码。RECORD是一种新颖的组合逻辑临时随机化编码方案，借助Quilt封装技术，可阻止攻击者对数据的解读。