Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a "reduced form" of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.

翻译：给定一个在联盟结构之间的标准近视动态过程，吸收集是指在该过程中一旦进入便永远不会离开的此类结构的最小集合。吸收集是联盟形成博弈中的一个重要解概念，但它们存在缺陷：可能规模较大且难以获取。在本文中，我们通过一个由少量联盟集合构成的集合（我们称之为博弈的“简化形式”）来刻画吸收集。我们将这一特征应用于研究若干经济环境中的稳定性收敛问题。