I study mechanism design with blockchain-based tokens, that is, tokens that can be used within a mechanism but can also be saved and traded outside of the mechanism. I do so by considering a repeated, private-value auction, in which the auctioneer accepts payments in a blockchain-based token he creates and initially owns. I show that the present-discounted value of the expected revenues is the same as in a standard auction with dollars, but these revenues accrue earlier and are less variable. The optimal monetary policy involves the burning of tokens used in the auction, a common feature of many blockchain-based auctions. I then introduce non-contractible effort and the possibility of misappropriating revenues. I compare the auction with tokens to an auction with dollars in which the auctioneer can also issue financial securities. An auction with tokens is preferred when there are sufficiently severe contracting frictions, while the opposite is true when contracting frictions are low.

翻译：我研究基于区块链代币的机制设计，即那些可在机制内部使用、同时也能在机制外部保存和交易的代币。具体而言，我考虑一个重复进行的私有价值拍卖，其中拍卖人接受他创建并初始拥有的区块链代币作为支付方式。研究表明，预期收益的现值贴现与使用美元的标准拍卖相同，但这些收益到账时间更早且波动性更小。最优货币政策涉及销毁拍卖中使用的代币，这是许多基于区块链的拍卖的共同特征。随后我引入不可契约化的努力以及挪用收益的可能性，将代币拍卖与拍卖人同样可以发行金融证券的美元拍卖进行比较。当契约摩擦足够严重时，代币拍卖更受青睐；而当契约摩擦较小时，情况则相反。