This study analyzes proposer-builder data and MEV-Boost payment data following the Ethereum merge in September 2022 to identify patterns of multi-block MEV. Our findings reveal fewer multi-slot sequences of builders than predicted by a random Monte Carlo simulation, with the longest observed sequence spanning 25 slots. Additionally, we observe that average MEV-Boost payments increase with the length of consecutive sequences, from approximately 0.05 ETH for single slots to 0.08 ETH for nine consecutive slots. Within longer sequences, payments per slot show a slight increase, suggesting that builders bid higher for longer sequences or the first slot after a longer sequence. A weak positive autocorrelation is found between subsequent MEV-Boost payments, challenging the hypothesis of alternating periods of low and high MEV. Finally, our comparison of builders during periods of low and high base fee volatility reveals minimal correlation, indicating the absence of builder specialization based on base fee volatility.

翻译：本研究通过分析2022年9月以太坊合并后的提议者-构建者数据与MEV-Boost支付数据，旨在识别多区块MEV的分布规律。研究发现：构建者连续出块序列的出现频率低于随机蒙特卡洛模拟的预测值，观测到的最长连续序列为25个区块。此外，MEV-Boost平均支付金额随连续序列长度增加而上升，从单区块约0.05 ETH增至连续九个区块的0.08 ETH。在较长连续序列中，单区块支付呈现轻微增长趋势，表明构建者可能为较长序列或长序列后的首个区块出价更高。后续MEV-Boost支付间存在微弱正自相关性，这对“低MEV与高MEV时期交替出现”的假说提出了挑战。最后，通过对比基础费用波动率高低时期的构建者表现，发现其相关性极低，表明不存在基于基础费用波动率的构建者专业化分工现象。