We study a natural competitive-information-design variant for the Pandora's Box problem (Weitzman 1979), where each box is associated with a strategic information sender who can design what information about the box's prize value to be revealed to the agent when the agent inspects the box. This variant with strategic boxes is motivated by a wide range of real-world economic applications for Pandora's Box. The main contributions of this article are two-fold: (1) we study informational properties of Pandora's Box by showing an intrinsic connection between informativeness of any box's value distribution and the utility order of the search agent; and (2) we fully characterize the pure symmetric equilibrium for the boxes' competitive information revelation, which reveals various insights regarding information competition and the resultant agent utility at equilibrium.

翻译：本文研究潘多拉魔盒问题（Weitzman 1979）的一种自然竞争性信息设计变体。在该变体中，每个盒子关联一个策略性信息发送者，后者可设计当代理检查盒子时，关于该盒子奖励价值的信息以何种方式向代理揭示。这一引入策略性盒子的变体，其动机源于潘多拉魔盒在广泛现实经济场景中的诸多应用。本文的主要贡献有两方面：（1）通过揭示任何盒子价值分布的信息性与搜索代理效用顺序之间的内在联系，研究潘多拉魔盒的信息属性；（2）完全刻画盒子在竞争性信息揭示中的纯对称均衡，进而揭示信息竞争及其对均衡状态下代理效用影响的多重见解。