The long-term success of cryptocurrencies largely depends on the incentive compatibility provided to the validators. Bribery attacks, facilitated trustlessly via smart contracts, threaten this foundation. This work introduces, implements, and evaluates three novel and efficient bribery contracts targeting Ethereum validators. The first bribery contract enables a briber to fork the blockchain by buying votes on their proposed blocks. The second contract incentivizes validators to voluntarily exit the consensus protocol, thus increasing the adversary's relative staking power. The third contract builds a trustless bribery market that enables the briber to auction off their manipulative power over the RANDAO, Ethereum's distributed randomness beacon. Finally, we provide an initial game-theoretical analysis of one of the described bribery markets.

翻译：加密货币的长期成功很大程度上取决于其为验证者提供的激励兼容性。通过智能合约以无需信任方式实施的贿赂攻击正威胁着这一基础。本研究提出、实现并评估了三种针对以太坊验证者的新型高效贿赂合约。第一种贿赂合约使贿赂者能够通过购买对其提议区块的投票来分叉区块链。第二种合约激励验证者自愿退出共识协议，从而增强攻击者的相对质押权重。第三种合约构建了一个无需信任的贿赂市场，使贿赂者能够拍卖其对以太坊分布式随机数信标RANDAO的操纵权。最后，我们对所描述的其中一种贿赂市场进行了初步的博弈论分析。