Post-quantum signature schemes introduce kilobyte-scale authorization artifacts when applied directly to blockchain transaction validation. A widely considered mitigation is to verify post-quantum signatures inside zero-knowledge circuits and publish only succinct proofs on-chain. However, this approach preserves the signature-centric authorization model, merely relocating the verification cost, and embeds expensive high-dimensional lattice arithmetic into prover circuits.We present ZK-ACE (Zero-Knowledge Authorization for Cryptographic Entities), an authorization layer that replaces transaction-carried signature objects entirely with identity-bound zero-knowledge authorization statements. Rather than proving the correctness of a specific post-quantum signature, the prover demonstrates in zero knowledge that a transaction is authorized by an identity consistent with an on-chain commitment and bound replay state. The construction assumes a deterministic identity derivation primitive (DIDP) as a black box and uses a compact identity commitment as the primary on-chain identity anchor, supplemented by per-transaction replay-prevention state. We formalize ZK-ACE with explicit game-based security definitions for authorization soundness, replay resistance, substitution resistance, and cross-domain separation. We present a complete circuit constraint specification, define two replay-prevention models, and provide reduction-based security proofs under standard assumptions (knowledge soundness, collision resistance, and DIDP identity-root recovery hardness). A structural, protocol-level data accounting demonstrates an order-of-magnitude reduction in consensus-visible authorization data relative to direct post-quantum signature deployment. The design supports batch aggregation and recursive proof composition, and is compatible with account-abstraction and rollup-based deployment architectures.

翻译：后量子签名方案直接应用于区块链交易验证时，会引入千字节级别的授权凭证。一种被广泛考虑的缓解方案是在零知识电路内部验证后量子签名，并仅在链上发布简洁证明。然而，该方法保留了以签名为中心的授权模型，仅转移了验证成本，并将昂贵的高维格运算嵌入到了证明者电路中。我们提出了ZK-ACE（面向密码实体的零知识授权），这是一个授权层，它完全用身份绑定的零知识授权声明取代了交易携带的签名对象。证明者并非证明某个特定后量子签名的正确性，而是在零知识中证明一笔交易是由一个与链上承诺及绑定的防重放状态一致的身份所授权的。该构造将确定性身份派生原语（DIDP）视为黑盒，并使用一个紧凑的身份承诺作为主要的链上身份锚点，辅以每笔交易的防重放状态。我们形式化了ZK-ACE，并给出了基于博弈的明确安全定义，涵盖授权可靠性、重放攻击抵抗性、替换攻击抵抗性和跨域分离性。我们给出了完整的电路约束规范，定义了两个防重放模型，并在标准假设（知识可靠性、抗碰撞性及DIDP身份根恢复困难性）下提供了基于归约的安全性证明。一项结构性的、协议层面的数据核算表明，相对于直接部署后量子签名，共识层可见的授权数据减少了一个数量级。该设计支持批量聚合与递归证明组合，并与账户抽象及基于Rollup的部署架构兼容。