Interactions with large language models have led to the suggestion that these models may be conscious. From the perspective of neuroscience, this position is difficult to defend. For one, the architecture of large language models is missing key features of the thalamocortical system that have been linked to conscious awareness in mammals. Secondly, the inputs to large language models lack the embodied, embedded information content characteristic of our sensory contact with the world around us. Finally, while the previous two arguments can be overcome in future AI systems, the third one might be harder to bridge in the near future. Namely, we argue that consciousness might depend on having 'skin in the game', in that the existence of the system depends on its actions, which is not true for present-day artificial intelligence.

翻译：与大型语言模型的互动使人们提出这些模型可能具有意识。从神经科学的角度看，这一立场难以成立。首先，大型语言模型的架构缺失了与哺乳动物意识知觉相关的丘脑皮层系统的关键特征。其次，大型语言模型的输入缺乏我们通过感官接触周围世界时所具备的具身化、情境化信息内容。最后，尽管前两个论点在未来的人工智能系统中可能被克服，但第三个论点在短期内可能更难弥合。具体而言，我们认为意识可能依赖于"置身风险之中"，即系统的存续取决于其行动结果，而这一点在当今人工智能中并不成立。