In the context of containment of default contagion in financial networks, we here study a regulator that allocates pre-shock capital or liquidity buffers across banks connected by interbank liabilities and common external asset exposures. The regulator chooses a nonnegative buffer vector under a linear budget before asset-price shocks realize. Shocks are modeled as belonging to either an $\ell_{\infty}$ or an $\ell_{1}$ uncertainty set, and the design objective is either to enlarge the certified no-default/no-insolvency region or to minimize worst-case clearing losses at a prescribed stress radius. Four exact synthesis results are derived. The buffer that maximizes the default resilience margin is obtained from a linear program and admits a closed-form minimal-budget certificate for any target margin. The buffer that maximizes the insolvency resilience margin is computed by a single linear program. At a fixed radius, minimizing the worst-case systemic loss is again a linear program under $\ell_{\infty}$ uncertainty and a linear program with one scenario block per asset under $\ell_{1}$ uncertainty. Crucially, under $\ell_{1}$ uncertainty, exact robustness adds only one LP block per asset, ensuring that the computational complexity grows linearly with the number of assets. A corollary identifies the exact budget at which the optimized worst-case loss becomes zero. Numerical experiments on the 8-bank benchmark of \cite{Calafiore2025}, on a synthetic core-periphery network, and on a data-backed 107-bank calibration built from the 2025 EBA transparency exercise show large gains over uniform and exposure-proportional allocations. The empirical results also indicate that resilience-maximizing and loss-minimizing interventions nearly coincide under diffuse $\ell_\infty$ shocks, but diverge under concentrated $\ell_1$ shocks.

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