We study equilibrium investment into bidding and latency reduction for different sequencing policies. For a batch auction design, we observe that bidders shade bids according to the likelihood that competing bidders land in the current batch. Moreover, in equilibrium, in the ex-ante investment stage before the auction, bidders invest into latency until they make zero profit in expectation. We compare the batch auction design to continuous time bidding policies (time boost) and observe that (depending on the choice of parameters) they obtain similar revenue and welfare guarantees.

翻译：本文研究了在不同排序策略下，投标人针对竞价与延迟降低的均衡投资行为。针对批量拍卖设计，我们观察到投标人会根据竞争对手落入当前批次的概率来调整报价。此外，在均衡状态下，投标人会在拍卖前的先验投资阶段持续投入延迟降低技术，直至预期利润降为零。通过将批量拍卖设计与连续时间竞价策略（时间加速机制）进行比较，我们发现（根据参数选择的不同）两者在收益与社会福利保障方面具有相似的表现。