Despite current security implementations, Internet activity on DoD networks is susceptible to web trackers and commercial data collection, which have the potential to expose information about service members and unit operations. This report documents the outcomes of a study to characterize web tracking occurring on Army CONUS unclassified networks. We derived a dataset from the Cloud-Based Internet Isolation (CBII) platform, encompassing data measured over a two-month period in 2024. This dataset comprised the 1,000 most frequently accessed Internet resources, determined by the number of connection requests on CONUS DoDIN-A during the study period. We then compared all domains and subdomains in the dataset against Ghostery's WhoTracks.me, an open-source database of commercial tracking entities. We found that over 21% of the domains accessed during the study period were Internet trackers. The ACI recommends that the Army implement changes to its enterprise networks to limit commercial Internet-based tracking, as well as policy changes towards the same end. With relatively minor configuration changes, CBII can serve as a more effective mitigation against risks posed by commercially available information.

翻译：尽管当前已部署安全防护措施，国防部网络上的互联网活动仍易受网络追踪器及商业数据收集的影响，这些行为可能导致军人和部队行动信息泄露。本报告记录了一项针对陆军本土非保密网络（CONUS）中网络追踪行为特征的研究结果。我们基于云隔离互联网访问（CBII）平台构建了一个数据集，涵盖2024年两个月的测量数据。该数据集包含研究期间根据CONUS DoDIN-A网络连接请求数确定的1000个最常访问的互联网资源。随后，我们将数据集中所有域名及子域名与Ghostery的WhoTracks.me开源商业追踪实体数据库进行比对。研究发现，超过21%的访问域名属于互联网追踪器。陆军网络司令部建议陆军对企业网络实施配置变更以限制商业互联网追踪，并同步推进相关政策调整。通过相对简单的配置优化，CBII平台可更有效地缓解商业信息获取所带来的风险。