We study the role of information and access in capacity-constrained selection problems with fairness concerns. We develop a statistical discrimination framework, where each applicant has multiple features and is potentially strategic. The model formalizes the trade-off between the (potentially positive) informational role of a feature and its (negative) exclusionary nature when members of different social groups have unequal access to this feature. Our framework finds a natural application to policy debates on dropping standardized testing in admissions. Our primary takeaway is that the decision to drop a feature (such as test scores) cannot be made without the joint context of the information provided by other features and how the requirement affects the applicant pool composition. Dropping a feature may exacerbate disparities by decreasing the amount of information available for each applicant, especially those from non-traditional backgrounds. However, in the presence of access barriers to a feature, the interaction between the informational environment and the effect of access barriers on the applicant pool size becomes highly complex. Furthermore, we consider an extension with two schools and costly tests, where strategic students decide whether to take the test or not. Our theoretical results reveal that the students' test-taking behavior can be non-monotonic. We characterize the two-school policy equilibria and show that each school's optimal decision to drop the test critically depends on the other school's test policy. Finally, using calibrated simulations, we demonstrate the presence of practical instances where the decision to eliminate standardized testing improves or worsens all metrics.

翻译：本研究探讨在关注公平性的容量受限选拔问题中信息与机会获取的作用。我们建立了一个统计歧视分析框架，其中每位申请者具有多重特征且可能采取策略行为。该模型形式化地描述了特征的（可能积极的）信息作用与其（消极的）排他性之间的权衡关系，这种权衡在不同社会群体对该特征的获取机会不均等时尤为显著。我们的分析框架自然适用于关于录取中取消标准化考试的政策辩论。核心结论表明：是否取消某项特征（如考试成绩）的决策，必须结合其他特征提供的信息背景以及该要求对申请者群体构成的影响来综合考量。取消特征可能通过减少每位申请者（特别是非传统背景申请者）的可获信息量而加剧不平等。然而，当存在特征获取障碍时，信息环境与获取障碍对申请者群体规模的影响会产生高度复杂的交互作用。此外，我们拓展研究了包含两所院校及成本化考试的模型，其中策略性学生需决定是否参加考试。理论结果表明学生的参考行为可能呈现非单调性。我们刻画了两校政策均衡，并证明每所院校取消考试的最优决策关键取决于另一所院校的考试政策。最后，通过校准模拟，我们证实了实践中存在标准化考试政策的取消可能改善或恶化所有评估指标的具体案例。