In resource contribution games, a class of non-cooperative games, the players want to obtain a bundle of resources and are endowed with bags of bundles of resources that they can make available into a common for all to enjoy. Available resources can then be used towards their private goals. A player is potentially satisfied with a profile of contributed resources when his bundle could be extracted from the contributed resources. Resource contention occurs when the players who are potentially satisfied, cannot actually all obtain their bundle. The player's preferences are always single-minded (they consider a profile good or they do not) and parsimonious (between two profiles that are equally good, they prefer the profile where they contribute less). What makes a profile of contributed resources good for a player depends on their attitude towards resource contention. We study the problem of deciding whether an outcome is a pure Nash equilibrium for three kinds of players' attitudes towards resource contention: public contention-aversity, private contention-aversity, and contention-tolerance. In particular, we demonstrate that in the general case when the players are contention-averse, then the problem is harder than when they are contention-tolerant. We then identify a natural class of games where, in presence of contention-averse preferences, it becomes tractable, and where there is always a Nash equilibrium.

翻译：在资源贡献博弈——一类非合作博弈中，参与者希望获取一组资源束，并拥有可贡献至公共池供所有人享用的资源束集合。可用资源随后可用于实现其私有目标。当参与者能从已贡献资源中提取其所需资源束时，该参与者可能对当前贡献状况感到满意。当潜在满意的参与者无法同时获取其全部资源束时，便产生资源竞争。参与者的偏好始终是单一目标取向（仅评判状况优劣）且精简节约（在同等优选的两种状况中，偏好贡献更少者）。何种贡献状况能使参与者满意，取决于其对资源竞争的态度。本研究针对参与者对资源竞争的三类态度：公共竞争回避、私有竞争回避与竞争容忍，探讨判定某一结果是否为纯策略纳什均衡的问题。特别地，我们证明：在一般情况下，当参与者持竞争回避态度时，该判定问题比竞争容忍情形更为复杂。随后我们识别出一类自然博弈，在此类博弈中，当参与者持竞争回避偏好时，问题变得可解，且始终存在纳什均衡。