Social media platforms have diverse content moderation policies, with many prominent actors hesitant to impose strict regulations. A key reason for this reluctance could be the competitive advantage that comes with lax regulation. A popular platform that starts enforcing content moderation rules may fear that it could lose users to less-regulated alternative platforms. Moreover, if users continue harmful activities on other platforms, regulation ends up being futile. This article examines the competitive aspect of content moderation by considering the motivations of all involved players (platformer, news source, and social media users), identifying the regulation policies sustained in equilibrium, and evaluating the information quality available on each platform. Applied to simple yet relevant social networks such as stochastic block models, our model reveals the conditions for a popular platform to enforce strict regulation without losing users. Effectiveness of regulation depends on the diffusive property of news posts, friend interaction qualities in social media, the sizes and cohesiveness of communities, and how much sympathizers appreciate surprising news from influencers.

翻译：社交媒体平台采用不同的内容审核策略，许多知名平台对实施严格监管持犹豫态度。这种犹豫的关键原因之一可能是宽松监管带来的竞争优势。开始实施内容审核规则的流行平台可能会担心用户流失到监管较宽松的替代平台。此外，如果用户在其他平台上继续从事有害活动，监管最终将徒劳无功。本文通过考虑所有参与方（平台、新闻来源和社交媒体用户）的动机，研究内容审核的竞争性特征，确定均衡状态下的监管政策，并评估各平台可用的信息质量。将模型应用于随机块模型等简单但相关的社交网络时，我们的模型揭示了流行平台在不流失用户的情况下实施严格监管的条件。监管的有效性取决于新闻帖子的传播特性、社交媒体中的好友互动质量、社区的规模与凝聚力，以及追随者对来自意见领袖的惊喜新闻的欣赏程度。