摘要：马赛克战常被视为与新兴颠覆性技术的进一步突破相关的遥远未来概念。本文认为，乌克兰战争挑战了这一观点。尽管乌克兰并未明确使用该术语，但其战场适应能力反映了马赛克战的核心原则，包括分布式低成本无人系统、自适应杀伤网、分散式决策以及快速的传感器到射手集成。文章表明，马赛克战不仅仅是一种推测性的未来愿景，更是理解当代战争中军事成功与效能日益有用的视角。同时，乌克兰的案例揭示了战争特性的变化，即作战优势越来越依赖于适应性、分布式兵力运用以及传感器、决策者和射手的快速集成，同时也暴露了当前在互操作性、通信韧性、持续保障和组织扩展方面的局限。

问题陈述：乌克兰战争如何通过展示马赛克战的核心原则已在当代战争中得到实施，从而挑战了将其普遍误解为遥远或过于未来主义概念的观点？

启示：军队、国防规划者和采购组织应停止将马赛克战视为遥远的未来概念，并立即开始从乌克兰汲取实际经验教训。即使乌克兰军队未直接使用该术语，其战场成功也与马赛克战的核心原则密切相关，特别是分布式无人系统、软件赋能杀伤网、授权主动性以及快速适应性的整合。因此，关键的概念转变是从以平台为中心的兵力设计转向模块化、可消耗、可互操作且能快速重组的能力。这需要在条令、采购、训练、数字集成和持续保障方面进行相应的变革。

引言

俄罗斯于2022年2月对乌克兰发起的全面入侵，造成了自第二次世界大战以来欧洲最广泛的大规模国家间战争，并为观察当代战争的演变提供了前所未有的实证环境。其中最引人注目的发展是分布式无人系统、数字集成平台和分散式决策实践在战场上的迅速扩散。虽然这些发展常被单独分析为“无人机战争”、网络化作战或战场创新的要素，但本文认为，通过马赛克战的概念视角可以更连贯地理解它们。尽管乌克兰并未明确使用该术语，但其许多战场实践反映了马赛克战的核心原则：分布式低成本系统、自适应杀伤网、分散式执行以及快速的传感器到射手集成。因此，乌克兰的案例挑战了马赛克战主要是一种与新兴颠覆性技术相关的遥远未来概念的普遍假设。

马赛克战：概念基础

美国国防高级研究计划局（DARPA）的战略技术办公室（STO）提出了马赛克战概念，以应对将多种任务集中于少数精良、高价值资产的以平台为中心的精致兵力设计日益下降的作战价值，以及美国相对于对手的技术优势正在减弱的问题[1]。这些系统的特点是开发周期长、适应性有限、指挥控制结构僵化，使其难以适应由反介入/区域拒止（A2/AD）战略、电子战和精确打击能力扩散所塑造的快速演变的作战环境[2]。诸如旨在破坏军事行动而攻击关键节点和网络的“系统摧毁战”等对抗性战术，突显了集中式系统和线性杀伤链的脆弱性[3]。

“瓦片”系统

马赛克战架构优先考虑松耦合、模块化和快速可组合性，使兵力包能够随着任务和威胁条件的变化而重新配置和重新分配[4]。马赛克设计不是将多种功能集中在少数紧密集成的多用途平台上，而是将能力分解为许多更小、专业化、可互操作的节点，这些节点可以组合成针对特定任务的定制化编组或兵力包[5]。在实践中，这通常意味着从“大而全”的所谓单体平台转向更小、更分布式的“瓦片”平台，包括无人系统，其中昂贵的多任务系统被分解为众多成本更低的单元，可以更广泛地部署。

这种设计逻辑支持可负担的规模，并通过冗余提高了韧性。如果执行特定功能的节点损失，可以派遣具有相同功能的另一个平台来恢复编组，而不会导致整体任务效能崩溃。然而，同样的分解将复杂性向上推至集成和协调层面。基于瓦片的部队必须同步大量异构节点，这增加了对通信、数据融合和指挥控制的需求[6]。

杀伤网

传统的杀伤链通常是线性和顺序的：传感器探测，信息流经指挥层，授权批准，射手交战——这造成了脆弱的依赖关系，单个节点的中断就可能导致整个链条瘫痪。相比之下，马赛克战青睐杀伤网：这种网络化架构提供了从感知到决策再到效果的多个并行路径，使部队能够重组可用节点、绕过损失路由、并在性能降级时保持作战节奏[7]。从概念上讲，这是通过功能分解实现的：与其将OODA（观察-判断-决策-行动）过程视为固定的线性链条，不如将观察、判断、决策、行动功能分离为可互操作的要素，然后为特定任务重新组合成多个并发的“路径”。这一点稍后将通过乌克兰实施的一个具体杀伤网实例加以说明。借鉴兹维贝尔森的观点，传统杀伤链可以类比为一棵树，一种具有可识别的树干-树枝依赖关系的层级化线性结构，这种结构产生了脆弱的关键节点[8]。相比之下，杀伤网则类似于根茎结构，一种多对多连接的去中心化网状结构，可以通过最短路径（避开层级）路由效果以提高速度，或者重新路由以绕过中断或被摧毁的节点。此外，根茎结构可以自我重组或修复。

重要的是，杀伤网不依赖于“无处不在”的连接；相反，网络化被视为任务自适应的，需要在带宽、覆盖范围和延迟之间取得平衡，以在拒止或高强度环境中维持信息流。成熟的杀伤网方法不仅仅是“连接更多”；它应具备弹性、敏捷性和智能性，能够在干扰或故障下持续运行，快速组装适合任务的编组，并利用人工智能支持进行编组规划、恢复和自适应学习等任务[9]。这些优势伴随着权衡：杀伤网增加了协调需求，并对指挥控制、通信和集成施加了更大压力，以防止分布式灵活性演变为分布式混乱。

决策、自主性与时间压缩

有效的马赛克战依赖于集中意图但分散执行。任务式指挥赋予下属目的和边界，同时给予他们行动自由。以决策为中心的战争则增加了在对抗条件下比对手做出并执行更快、更好决策的目标[10]。两者结合，使得较低层级能够抓住稍纵即逝的机会，而无需等待上级批准。总体而言，马赛克概念旨在通过加速OODA循环和减少杀伤过程延迟来压缩时间[11]。

以决策为中心的术语来说，马赛克部队不仅通过加速自身的OODA循环寻求优势，还通过使对手“观察”和解读兵力结构与意图的能力复杂化来寻求优势，从而即使在战场透明度高的条件下也能延长对手的决策周期[12]。通过使用诱饵、虚假辐射和误导性运动模式，马赛克部队制造关于其真实兵力结构和意图的混乱，然后在行动时刻才揭示实际攻击路径，从而突然打乱对手的决策周期。

自主性以两种互补形式为核心：人的自主性（战术边缘的授权决策权）和机器赋能的自主性/自动化，后者加速执行并减轻认知负荷。自动化还可以通过支持在带宽限制或网络中断下的协作信息处理和传输，以及通过数据驱动的态势理解协助指挥官实现“先探测-先理解-先行动”的效果，来支持分布式指挥控制[13]。通过将决策权和执行能力前推，部队即使在与上级总部的联系中断时，也能保持局部主动性和效果生成能力。这种韧性在对抗性电磁频谱环境中尤其宝贵，因为对手的电子战会威胁到集中式指挥控制网络或因射频辐射和其他特征信号而导致的探测[14]。

并非所有形式的战场适应或技术创新都自动构成马赛克战。该概念特指分布式架构，其中模块化的“瓦片”可以动态重组为针对特定任务的兵力包，跨异构系统集成感知、决策和效果。虽然乌克兰的战时适应包括许多符合此种方法的要素，如分布式无人机运用、数字化战场集成和分散式执行，但冲突的其他方面仍受更传统动态（如以炮兵为中心的消耗战和阵地战）的影响。因此，区分一般性适应与真正的马赛克式架构对于避免过度扩展该概念，并阐明乌克兰战场实践中哪些具体特征与马赛克战原则相符，至关重要。

乌克兰战场创新（2022–2025年）

分布式大规模低成本无人系统运用

俄罗斯的全面入侵始于2022年2月，投入了一支前置部署且具备战斗力的部队，但相对于其政治目标而言规模有限，旨在通过对乌克兰重心基辅的快速机械化推进制造震慑效果。其作战构想结合了空中突击（最引人注目的是夺取霍斯托梅尔/安东诺夫机场的企图）与旨在夺取关键节点、扰乱乌克兰指挥控制并对政治重心施加压力的纵深装甲突击[15]。可以说，俄罗斯的部队质量在此初始阶段处于最高水平。然而，相对于任务规模，可用兵力有限，且其规划假设显然预期的是快速崩溃而非持续抵抗。实际上，俄罗斯部队在协调、指挥控制和后勤方面遇到困难，快速营级战术群的机动遭遇了乌克兰的坚决防御[16]。此阶段的特点是快速机械化运动，部队被命令以行政纵队沿公路推进，这使其容易遭受伏击和乌克兰广泛使用的便携式反坦克制导武器（特别是“标枪”和NLAW）的攻击[17]。重要的是，“快速推进”并未随着俄罗斯对基辅的攻势停滞而结束。2022年9月，乌克兰在哈尔科夫攻势中展示了大规模快速机动能力，利用俄军防守薄弱的区域实现了快速突破，并在数天内收复了大片领土[18]。

从2022年底到2023年，战争更明确地转向以炮兵为中心的消耗战和阵地战，由防御工事、雷区和激烈的侦察-打击对抗塑造的前线日益稳定[19]。无人机支持的观察改善了目标定位并压缩了杀伤链，使得炮兵和弹药供应成为伤亡和作战节奏的核心驱动因素。这种动态支撑了消耗战，尤其是在巴赫穆特周边，并框定了乌克兰2023年的反攻，面对层层防御地带，进展必然是缓慢且更有条理的[20]。俄罗斯试图通过“绞肉机”式攻击和反复的装甲突击重获主动权，在堑壕和地雷环境中往往造成高损失而收获有限[21]。总体而言，这一时期突显了乌克兰对更多火炮系统、弹药和情报、监视与侦察（ISR）赋能器的需求日益增长，因为战争从快速机动转向了持续的火力、消耗和耐力比拼[22]。

乌克兰以无人机为中心的战争最好被理解为不仅是一种技术转变，更是一种与马赛克战原则相一致的组织和作战转型与演变[23]。大量低成本无人机促成了分布式感知与打击架构，其中许多可消耗平台同时作为传感器、中继器和射手运行。乌克兰部队不是将能力集中在少数高价值平台上，而是通过将众多小型系统灵活重组并集成到自适应侦察-打击网络中产生效果[24]。这种架构实现了快速的传感器到射手集成，通过冗余提高了韧性，并使战术单位能够动态地将针对特定任务的“瓦片”组装成作战杀伤网[25]。从这个意义上说，战场上日益增长的以无人机为中心的趋势，反映了向分布式和模块化兵力运用的更广泛转变，而不仅仅是无人平台的扩散[26][27][28][29][30]。

到2025年，无人地面车辆（UGV）在最后一公里后勤和伤员后送方面变得重要，其明确目标是减少人员在接触线附近暴露于炮火和无处不在的无人机威胁的风险[31]。然而，作为配备重机枪的武装平台，它们在作战中的重要性日益增加。诸如一名操作员监控多辆无人地面车辆、监视多个摄像头画面、仅在目标出现时进行手动控制等概念，符合更广泛的趋势：接触线上的人员更少，杀伤区内有更多的传感器和可消耗系统[32]。乌克兰部署低成本、装载炸药的海上无人水面艇（USV），在没有海军的情况下，通过迫使俄罗斯黑海舰队主力舰艇从塞瓦斯托波尔撤退到更远的港口，从根本上削弱了其在区域内的主导地位[33]。与这一海上成功并行的是，乌克兰拦截无人机的迅速成熟为近程防空增加了一个日益决定性、低成本的层次。到2026年2月，像“野黄蜂”高速“毒刺”这样的系统据称在基辅及其周边地区摧毁了超过70%的来袭“沙希德-136”/“天竺葵-2”型单向攻击无人机，从而减少了对稀缺的西方地对空导弹的依赖，并将其保留用于应对更高端的威胁[34]。总体趋势是明确的：战争持续越久，就越明显地类似于以小型无人系统为中心的战争，不断扩大的对抗性监视与打击范围稳步提高了机动、再补给和集中的成本。

乌克兰在小型低成本无人系统方面的快速战场创新，是由一个去中心化的生态系统驱动的，在这个系统中，士兵、志愿者、初创公司和旅级部队将广泛可用的民用技术大规模改造为军事能力[35]。关键的是，决定性的转变更多地依赖于现有技术的新颖应用和大规模扩散，而非技术突破，报告强调“真正的改变不在于技术创新本身，而在于现有技术的新颖应用”[36]。这个生态系统将紧密的“开发-战斗测试-修改-战斗测试”循环制度化，通过前线用户和开发者之间的直接反馈回路，将传统的研发周期从数年压缩到数月，实现了“大规模战术实验，随后武装部队广泛采用技术”[37]。这些模式与马赛克战强调分布式、分解的能力架构和模块化高度一致，最初由DARPA提出，即将许多不同的“瓦片”（具有不同的传感器和武器）组装成针对特定任务的兵力包，以实现效果集中而非兵力集中。DARPA进一步强调可消耗性是核心驱动力，即部署大量可消耗平台，这些平台可以在承受损失的同时维持作战输出。

自适应杀伤网的出现

乌克兰的战时轨迹指向自适应杀伤网而非线性杀伤链的出现，因为其以“德尔塔”（Delta）为中心并与“GIS阿尔塔”（GIS Arta）和“克罗皮瓦”（Kropyva）等系统相连的作战软件生态系统，作为一个联邦集成层运行，跨层级连接传感器、决策者和射手，而非依赖单一固定的传感器到射手序列[38]。“德尔塔”是一个军事态势感知和战场集成平台，将来自无人机、卫星、固定摄像头、传感器、侦察单位和其他报告流的信息汇总到一个共享的作战图中，而“元素”（Element）支持安全协调，“德尔塔管”（Delta Tube）分发实时视频，“任务控制”（Mission Control）协助飞行规划，从而在战场压力下维持快速重新分配任务的能力[39]。在这个更广泛的架构中，“GIS阿尔塔”作为一个指挥控制与火力任务分配系统，执行的功能最常被类比为“炮兵版优步”（Uber for artillery），因为它汇集来自无人机、前沿观察员、雷达、智能手机、GPS设备和其他来源的目标数据，然后将火力任务匹配给最能以速度、精度和经济性提供所需效果的可用火炮、迫击炮、导弹或无人机单位[40]。“克罗皮瓦”作为一个前线战术火力控制和导航工具，通过支持任务规划、射击解算、阵地交换以及在连接降级下的离线操作，补充了这一架构，从而在通信受到对抗或部分中断时保持作战功能[41]。总的来说，这些系统使乌克兰部队能够压缩目标定位周期、动态分配火力、并在特定节点受到干扰、降级或摧毁时重新路由效果，这就是为什么乌克兰的战场管理越来越像一张网而非一条链。

边缘指挥控制与乌克兰通过人机自主实现的时间压缩

乌克兰的人员自主性和主动性（授权和分散式战术执行）被广泛追溯到2014年后的改革和伙伴培训，这些改革和培训旨在分散指挥、使士官队伍专业化，并将领导文化转向任务式指挥原则[42]。一份关于西方培训工作的详细学术报告指出，任务式指挥被有意地作为“可输出的专业知识”进行教授和示范，以使下属能在指挥官意图范围内更快行动，同时也指出了实施中的摩擦：乌克兰方面缺乏与“任务式指挥”对等的术语，且该概念与苏联遗留的等级制度和有限的信任相冲突[43]。在作战实践中，战争早期的证据也表明，乌克兰部队在迅速展开的交战中保持了战术主动性，即使高层指示不完整或中断，也能有效行动[44]。这种文化上的“行动许可”有效地将数量上的短缺转化为节奏优势，允许分散的小型单位通过更快的局部决策和利用稍纵即逝的机会来弥补，这与马赛克战的分权执行和快速重组原则高度一致。同时，多项评估提醒，自主性和分散化并非普遍一致：随着战争规模扩大，某些功能（特别是侦察/无人机“屏幕”）在营和旅级变得更加集中，外部观察者将乌克兰武装部队的整体指挥方式描述为北约式任务式指挥愿景与更集中控制倾向的混合体[45]。然而，实践因单位和层级而异，一些指挥官接受任务式指挥原则，而另一些则保持更严格的控制，这反映了条令的不确定性和个人领导风格[46]。

乌克兰马赛克战的另一个显著特征是通过分布式情报、监视、侦察与打击集成压缩了传感器到射手的时间线。传统的目标定位周期：探测、识别、决策、交战，通常需要数小时甚至数天，因为信息需经过指挥层级传递并获得交战授权。乌克兰部队通过将传感器与射手并置、将交战授权下放至战术层级、以及采用自动化或半自动化作战管理系统，将这些周期压缩至数分钟甚至数秒[47]。此外，乌克兰通过将感知和打击决策下放至战术无人机操作员，并辅以人工智能赋能的目标识别、跟踪、自主导航和末段目标锁定，压缩了杀伤周期，从而在对抗性电磁条件下改善了对稍纵即逝目标的交战能力，同时并未取消人对开火决策的控制[48]。

技术与组织适应

平台异构性与传感器集成

乌克兰的杀伤网由商用、临时改装和专用军用平台的异构组合构建而成。虽然这种多样性在常规兵力规划中通常被视为不利因素，因为它使互操作性复杂化并增加了训练、维护和后勤的负担，但乌克兰已将其转化为作战优势。使用多种平台类型和采购渠道增加了冗余，实现了快速替换和迭代，并使俄罗斯部队更难通过针对特定平台的反制措施压制乌克兰的能力[49]。平台组合包括用于近程情报、监视与侦察的小型商用四轴飞行器（大疆“御”系列、道通等类似产品）；改装用于自杀式攻击的FPV竞速无人机；专用巡飞弹（“弹簧刀”、“凤凰幽灵”及乌克兰自研系统）；中航时战术无人机系统（RQ-11“渡鸦”、“美洲狮”及同等产品）；以及用于纵深侦察的大型战役级系统[50]。每个平台类别服务于不同的角色，显著的重叠性支持了替换和冗余。传感器集成超越了战术无人机系统，扩展到国家卫星侦察、西方情报、监视与侦察资产（包括天基和机载系统）、地基传感器和人力情报网络[51]。乌克兰的作战管理系统融合了这些多源输入，创建了一个具有冗余覆盖和多重提示路径的分层情报、监视与侦察架构。考虑到数据格式、安全分类和组织边界的多样性，这种集成在技术上具有挑战性，是通过专用软件、商业工具以及由志愿者程序员和军事技术人员开发的临时接口组合实现的[52]。

通信架构与态势感知

乌克兰的分布式杀伤网需要能够在对抗性电磁频谱条件下将传感器数据从分散平台传输到射手和作战管理节点的通信架构。乌克兰部队混合使用了视距无线电链路、商用蜂窝网络、卫星通信（星链）和临时中继技术来维持连接[53]。这种异构通信架构通过多样性提供了韧性：当俄罗斯电子战干扰一种链路类型时，可以使用替代方案，但缺乏标准化接口和数据格式使自动融合和跨平台协调复杂化[54]。乌克兰部队严重依赖人工操作员手动整合来自不同来源的数据，增加了认知负担并限制了可扩展性[55]。通信链路对俄罗斯电子战的脆弱性成为一个关键的摩擦点。俄罗斯部队对GPS、商用蜂窝网络和无人机控制链路采用了复杂的干扰和欺骗手段，迫使乌克兰操作员采取包括跳频、定向天线、自主导航和减少对实时链路依赖在内的反制措施[56]。持续的电子战-反电子战循环推动了乌克兰通信架构的持续适应，双方都在压缩的时间框架内迭代战术和技术[57]。

在这种异构通信架构中，乌克兰的“德尔塔”作战软件作为一个基于云的作战管理和数据融合系统，从一个态势感知地图（由“空中侦察”构想）演变为一个将雷达、视频、文本、人力情报、信号情报和伙伴情报集成到单一作战图中的平台，可从旅级访问至总参谋部级[58]。从技术上讲，“德尔塔”的“类谷歌地图”界面支持分层过滤、历史活动模式分析，并通过高亮电子战影响区域来协助无人机打击任务规划，有助于将分散的传感器数据流转化为可执行的任务[59]。“德尔塔”也处于一个更广泛的作战软件生态系统之中（例如，大多数炮兵使用的“克罗皮瓦”），报告称该系统将目标定位时间从20多分钟缩短至约1分钟，从而缩短了传感器到射手的工作流程[60]。

关键能力差距与摩擦点

技术差距与挑战

尽管取得了作战上的成功，对乌克兰战时“杀伤网”/马赛克式战法的分析强调，在通信碎片化、装备异构化和激烈电子战的条件下，技术和集成摩擦仍会制约其可扩展性和韧性[61]。一个反复被指出的差距是，难以在一个由传感器、通信链路和战场管理工具组成的多样化生态系统中实现标准化互操作性，这些系统是在战场压力下涌现并扩展的，而非通过单一、预先规划的企业架构[62]。在实践中，互操作性参差不齐，当系统无法平滑集成时，广泛依赖手动变通方案（例如，在应用程序间传输屏幕截图）[63]。这些变通方案使人员仍需介入基本的数据传输和关联，增加了操作员工作量，并限制了传感器到射手协同的自动化程度。缺乏即插即用的标准化，可与美国的模块化开放系统方法（MOSA）相比较，美国法律将其定义为一种模块化设计和接口策略，旨在支持广泛采用的标准，并实现组件的更易集成和替换[64]。相比之下，乌克兰的软件与平台生态系统往往不得不通过务实的集成和变通方案“共同成长”，即使像“德尔塔”这样的系统是明确作为集成平台开发的，并按照北约互操作性标准进行测试，以便与盟军系统交换作战态势图[65]。因此，实现更强的马赛克战可扩展性被广泛视为一个架构挑战：转向开放、模块化的数据交换方法和通用集成路径，以减少工具间定制化拼接的需求[66]。另一个技术差距涉及人工智能赋能的自主性和指挥控制：降低对干扰的敏感性、限制操作员工作量和人员暴露风险，以及实现更大规模无人系统群的同步运用，越来越需要不依赖持续射频链路或光纤长度的机载导航、感知和协调功能[67]。合乎逻辑的下一步是发展网络化、日益智能的蜂群，或更广泛地说，由人类操作员设定目标和约束、系统在群内自主分配任务的多低成本平台协同群组。此类蜂群将通过使分布式资产能够协调、重新分配功能并以更少的人工微观管理产生效果，从而有助于更无缝、更成熟地实施马赛克战。这有望实现更好的同步、冲突消解，以及跨多个平台同时产生分布式集群效果。与此同时，这也提高了对可互操作数据交换、安全网状网络和可靠边缘融合的要求。随着自主性从辅助功能转向目标交战，人类将日益复杂的任务委托给人工智能赋能系统，直接人工控制的程度可能会削弱。这反过来又加剧了在马赛克战背景下围绕致命性自主武器系统的法律和伦理关切。

乌克兰武装部队实施马赛克战的社会与组织差距

乌克兰扩展类马赛克战实践的能力受到组织摩擦的限制，特别是在大规模战时部队中捕获、验证和传播快速变化经验教训的困难[68]。尽管自下而上的创新产生了有效的局部解决方案，但各旅的采用情况仍不均衡，整合民用技术的限制也阻碍了更广泛的实施[69]。这些差距因多代际部队内部的文化差异而加剧，这种文化将苏联式层级制与非正式横向网络相结合，使得主动性和扩散在早期采用者之外并不一致[70]。评估指出，乌克兰正在摆脱集中式指挥，但持久的适应需要更强的训练、学习、领导和条令，以便在整个部队中制度化新实践[71]。

分布式后勤、生产能力与快速过时

后勤保障限制了乌克兰可消耗无人系统模型的可扩展性，因为大规模使用低成本、高损耗平台对替换品、电池、备件、弹药和维修能力产生了巨大需求[72]。乌克兰通过商业采购、志愿者网络和外国支持维持了这一模式，但这种很大程度上临时性的系统面临明显限制，因为分散的部队也需要在对抗条件下进行本地维修、前沿储备和韧性分发[73]。这些压力使得集中式后勤枢纽日益脆弱，并推动乌克兰转向更多分布式、冗余的、具有多条供应路径的保障网络[74]。随着无人机使用从数千架扩展到数万架系统，制度化的后勤、受保护的生产能力和更强的维护基础设施对于维持战斗力变得至关重要[75]。与此同时，快速的“措施-反制措施”循环意味着许多前线适应措施在能够全面列装之前就已过时，这使跨混合代次装备的标准化、训练、维护和互操作性变得复杂[76]。

结论

乌克兰战争表明，马赛克战未必是一个主要与量子计算、高超音速导弹或其他高度先进的突破性系统等新兴颠覆性技术相关的遥远未来概念。相反，乌克兰的案例证明，通过现有技术的创造性集成、分布式架构和适应性作战实践，其许多核心原则已在当代战争中显现。尽管乌克兰并未明确使用“马赛克战”这一术语，但其战场适应仍反映了该概念的许多核心特征。最重要的是，乌克兰展示了分布式低成本无人系统、适应性杀伤网、分散式决策、快速传感器到射手集成以及持续战场驱动创新的军事价值。这些实践使乌克兰军队能够通过灵活组合许多更小且通常可消耗的要素来产生效果，而非主要依赖数量有限的高度集成且昂贵的平台。从这个意义上说，乌克兰案例表明，马赛克战的实践相关性与其说在于未来主义技术本身，不如说在于比对手更快地连接、重组和适应异构能力的能力。与此同时，战争也强调，马赛克战并非单纯的技术问题。乌克兰的成功不仅依赖于无人系统和数字工具，还依赖于组织和文化因素，特别是下放的主动性、快速学习、前线用户与开发者之间的紧密反馈循环，以及在战场压力下进行实验的意愿。因此，这种方法的有效性取决于技术、指挥文化和机构适应性之间的相互作用。在实践中，马赛克战既是关于硬件或软件，也同样关乎组织设计和作战方法。然而，乌克兰的经验也暴露了当前实施这一概念的成熟度局限。异构平台、碎片化通信、不均衡的互操作性、沉重的电子战压力、手动变通方案以及持续的后勤负担，都使分布式作战系统的规模化和制度化变得复杂。因此，乌克兰既验证了马赛克战的作战相关性，同时也展示了在消耗和持续适应条件下实现标准化、集成和维持的难度。

核心启示是明确的。不应将乌克兰视为孤立的特例，而应将其视为一个非常重要的迹象，表明马赛克战的逻辑已经在塑造成功的当代战争，即使并未使用该术语进行描述。因此，关键挑战不在于此类概念是否重要，而在于条令、采购、指挥控制和后勤保障必须如何改变，以使武装力量在未来冲突中更加分布式、可互操作、可消耗和适应性强。

[1] Stew Magnuson, “DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic Warfare,” DARPA, 2018, https://www.darpa.mil/news/features/mosaic-warfare; Timothy P. Grayson and Samuele Lilliu, “Mosaic Warfare and Human–Machine Symbiosis,” Scientific Video Protocols 1, no. 1 (January 24, 2021): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.32386/scivpro.000024; Peter Simon Sapaty, “Mosaic Warfare: From Philosophy to Model to Solutions,” International Robotics & Automation Journal 5, no. 5 (September 2019): 157–66, https://doi.org/10.15406/iratj.2019.05.00190.

[2] Bryan Clark, Daniel Patt, and Harrison Schramm, Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/mosaic-warfare-exploiting-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomous-systems-to-implement-decision-centric-operations; Jessie Riposo, Megan McKernan, and Chelsea Kaihoi, Prolonged Cycle Times and Schedule Growth in Defense Acquisition: A Literature Review (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR455.html; Jeff Hagen, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, and Matthew Carroll, The Foundations of Operational Resilience—Assessing the Ability to Operate in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Environment: The Analytical Framework, Lexicon, and Characteristics of the Operational Resilience Analysis Model (ORAM) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1265.html.

[3] Heather R. Penney, Scale, Scope, Speed & Survivability: Winning the Kill Chain Competition, Mitchell Institute Policy Paper 40 (Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, May 2023), https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/scale-scope-speed-survivability-winning-the-kill-chain-competition/; Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare: How the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Seeks to Wage Modern Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1708.html.

[4] DARPA, “Strategic Technology Office Outlines Vision for ‘Mosaic Warfare,’” August 4, 2017, https://www.darpa.mil/news/2017/sto-mosaic-warfare; Stew Magnuson, “DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic Warfare,” DARPA, 2018, https://www.darpa.mil/news/features/mosaic-warfare; Timothy P. Grayson and Samuele Lilliu, “Mosaic Warfare and Human–Machine Symbiosis,” Scientific Video Protocols 1, no. 1 (January 24, 2021): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.32386/scivpro.000024.

[5] Timothy P. Grayson and Samuele Lilliu, “Mosaic Warfare and Human–Machine Symbiosis,” Scientific Video Protocols 1, no. 1 (January 24, 2021): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.32386/scivpro.000024; Bryan Clark, Daniel Patt, and Harrison Schramm, Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/mosaic-warfare-exploiting-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomous-systems-to-implement-decision-centric-operations; DARPA, “Strategic Technology Office Outlines Vision for ‘Mosaic Warfare.’”

[6] Timothy R. Gulden, Jonathan Lamb, Jeff Hagen, and Nicholas A. O’Donoughue, Modeling Rapidly Composable, Heterogeneous, and Fractionated Forces: Findings on Mosaic Warfare from an Agent-Based Model (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4396.html; Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Harrison Schramm, Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/mosaic-warfare-exploiting-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomous-systems-to-implement-decision-centric-operations; Heather R. Penney, Scale, Scope, Speed & Survivability: Winning the Kill Chain Competition, Mitchell Institute Policy Paper 40 (Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, May 2023), https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/scale-scope-speed-survivability-winning-the-kill-chain-competition/.

[7] Timothy P. Grayson and Samuele Lilliu, “Mosaic Warfare and Human–Machine Symbiosis,” Scientific Video Protocols 1, no. 1 (January 24, 2021): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.32386/scivpro.000024; Bryan Clark, Daniel Patt, and Harrison Schramm, Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/mosaic-warfare-exploiting-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomous-systems-to-implement-decision-centric-operations; Heather R. Penney, Scale, Scope, Speed & Survivability: Winning the Kill Chain Competition, Mitchell Institute Policy Paper 40 (Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, May 2023), https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/scale-scope-speed-survivability-winning-the-kill-chain-competition/; Sun Zhangjun, Tang Qiang, and Li Hao, “Cooperative Control and Management for UAS in Distributed Dynamic Kill Web,” in Proceedings of 2023 Chinese Intelligent Systems Conference, ed. Yingmin Jia, Weicun Zhang, Yongling Fu, and Jiqiang Wang (Singapore: Springer, 2023), 729–30, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6882-4_60; Ashley Ruiz, “The Future of War: Kill-Chain Supremacy and Ukraine’s Lessons,” Journal of Strategic Security 18, no. 4 (2025): 53–63, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.18.4.2592; Nicholas A. O’Donoughue, Samantha McBirney, and Brian Persons, Distributed Kill Chains: Drawing Insights for Mosaic Warfare from the Immune System and from the Navy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA573-1.html.

[8] Ben Zweibelson, Beyond the Pale: Designing Military Decision-Making Anew (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2023), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_181_Zweibelson_Beyond_the_Pale_.pdf.

[9] Bo Yu, Huachun Tan, Yanan Zhao, Bin Xu, and Yifan Dong, “Preliminary Analysis of the Structure of Land Unmanned Combat Systems Based on Mosaic Warfare,” in Proceedings of 2025 13th China Conference on Command and Control, vol. 1517 of Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering (Singapore: Springer, 2026), 397–410, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-95-5021-0_33.

[10] Bryan Clark, Daniel Patt, and Harrison Schramm, Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/mosaic-warfare-exploiting-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomous-systems-to-implement-decision-centric-operations; Bryan Clark, “The Emergence of Decision-Centric Warfare,” in Technological Innovation and Security: The Impact on the Strategic Environment in East Asia, NIDS International Symposium on Security Affairs 2021 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, September 2022), 17–32, https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/event/proceedings/symposium/pdf/2021/e_01.pdf; Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton, Implementing Decision-Centric Warfare: Elevating Command and Control to Gain an Optionality Advantage (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2021), https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/implementing-decision-centric-warfare-elevating-command-and-control-to-gain-an-optionality-advantage.

[11] Stew Magnuson, “DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic Warfare,” DARPA, 2018, https://www.darpa.mil/news/features/mosaic-warfare; Timothy P. Grayson and Samuele Lilliu, “Mosaic Warfare and Human–Machine Symbiosis,” Scientific Video Protocols 1, no. 1 (January 24, 2021): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.32386/scivpro.000024; Bryan Clark, Daniel Patt, and Harrison Schramm, Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/mosaic-warfare-exploiting-artificial-intelligence-and-autonomous-systems-to-implement-decision-centric-operations; Bryan Clark, “The Emergence of Decision-Centric Warfare,” in Technological Innovation and Security: The Impact on the Strategic Environment in East Asia, NIDS International Symposium on Security Affairs 2021 (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, September 2022), 17–32, https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/event/proceedings/symposium/pdf/2021/e_01.pdf; Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton, Implementing Decision-Centric Warfare: Elevating Command and Control to Gain an Optionality Advantage (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, March 2021), https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/implementing-decision-centric-warfare-elevating-command-and-control-to-gain-an-optionality-advantage.

[12] Bo Yu, Huachun Tan, Yanan Zhao, Bin Xu, and Yifan Dong, “Preliminary Analysis of the Structure of Land Unmanned Combat Systems Based on Mosaic Warfare,” in Proceedings of 2025 13th China Conference on Command and Control, vol. 1517 of Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering (Singapore: Springer, 2026), 397–410, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-95-5021-0_33.

[13] Timothy P. Grayson and Samuele Lilliu, “Mosaic Warfare and Human–Machine Symbiosis,” Scientific Video Protocols 1, no. 1 (January 24, 2021): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.32386/scivpro.000024; Bo Yu, Huachun Tan, Yanan Zhao, Bin Xu, and Yifan Dong, “Preliminary Analysis of the Structure of Land Unmanned Combat Systems Based on Mosaic Warfare,” in Proceedings of 2025 13th China Conference on Command and Control, vol. 1517 of Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering (Singapore: Springer, 2026), 397–410, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-95-5021-0_33; Jack Watling, The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023); Jack Watling, Supporting Command and Control for Land Forces on a Data-Rich Battlefield, RUSI Occasional Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, July 2023), https://static.rusi.org/Supporting-command-and-control-for-land-forces-on-a-data-rich-battlefield.pdf; Michael Mayer, “Trusting Machine Intelligence: Artificial Intelligence and Human-Autonomy Teaming in Military Operations,” Defense and Security Analysis 39, no. 4 (2023): 521–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2264070; Sidharth Kaushal, Justin Lynch, Juliana Suess, Jung-Ju Lee, Luke Vannurden, and Ylber Bajraktari, Leveraging Human–Machine Teaming, RUSI Special Resources (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, January 2024), https://static.rusi.org/human-machine-teaming-sr-jan-2024.pdf.

[14] Jack Watling, The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023); Jack Watling, Supporting Command and Control for Land Forces on a Data-Rich Battlefield, RUSI Occasional Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, July 27, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/supporting-command-and-control-land-forces-data-rich-battlefield.

[15] Seth G. Jones, “Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 1, 2022), https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare; Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds, Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI Special Report (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, November 30, 2022), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022.

[16] Seth G. Jones, “Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 1, 2022), https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare; Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds, Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI Special Report (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, November 30, 2022), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022.

[17] Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds, Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022, RUSI Special Report (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, November 30, 2022), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022.

[18] Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11, 2022,” Institute for the Study of War, September 11, 2022, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_88.

[19] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, RUSI Special Report (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, May 19, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine; Mark Hvizda, Bryan Frederick, Alisa Laufer, Alexandra T. Evans, Kristen Gunness, and David A. Ochmanek, Dispersed, Disguised, and Degradable: The Implications of the Fighting in Ukraine for Future U.S.-Involved Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3141-2.html; Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive, RUSI Special Report (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, September 4, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/stormbreak-fighting-through-russian-defences-ukraines-2023-offensive.

[20] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, RUSI Special Report (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, May 19, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine; Mark Hvizda, Bryan Frederick, Alisa Laufer, Alexandra T. Evans, Kristen Gunness, and David A. Ochmanek, Dispersed, Disguised, and Degradable: The Implications of the Fighting in Ukraine for Future U.S.-Involved Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3141-2.html; Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive, RUSI Special Report (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, September 4, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/stormbreak-fighting-through-russian-defences-ukraines-2023-offensive.

[21] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, RUSI Special Report (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, May 19, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine.

[22] See Jack Watling, The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023); Jack Watling, Supporting Command and Control for Land Forces on a Data-Rich Battlefield, RUSI Occasional Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, July 27, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/supporting-command-and-control-land-forces-data-rich-battlefield.

[23] Bohdan Kostiuk, Daryna-Maryna Patiuk, Anastasiya Shapochkina, and Élie Tenenbaum, Mapping the MilTech War: Eight Lessons from Ukraine’s Battlefield, Focus Stratégique no. 132 (Paris: Ifri, February 2026), https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/ifri_tenenbaum_et_al_miltech_war_ukraine_2026_0.pdf; Stacie Pettyjohn, Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, February 8, 2024), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/evolution-not-revolution; Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Mason Clark, Karolina Hird, Nataliya Bugayova, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, and George Barros, Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, August 12, 2024), https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Ukraine20and20the20Problem20of20Restoring20Maneuver20in20Contemporary20War_final.pdf.

[24] See Jack Watling, The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023); Jack Watling, Supporting Command and Control for Land Forces on a Data-Rich Battlefield, RUSI Occasional Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, July 27, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/supporting-command-and-control-land-forces-data-rich-battlefield.

[25] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, RUSI Special Report (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, May 19, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine; Oleksandra Molloy, Drones in Modern Warfare: Lessons Learnt from the War in Ukraine, Australian Army Occasional Paper 29 (Australian Army Research Centre, 2024), https://doi.org/10.61451/267513.

[26] Stacie Pettyjohn, Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, February 8, 2024), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/evolution-not-revolution; Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, with Mason Clark, Karolina Hird, Nataliya Bugayova, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, and George Barros, Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, August 2024), https://understandingwar.org/research/future-of-war/ukraine-and-the-problem-of-restoring-maneuver-in-contemporary-war/; Jack Watling, “Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine,” RUSI Insights Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, October 23, 2025), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/emergent-approaches-combined-arms-manoeuvre-ukraine; Tsiporah Fried, The Impact of Drones on the Battlefield: Lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War from a French Perspective (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, November 13, 2025), https://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/impact-drones-battlefield-lessons-russian-ukraine-war-french-perspective-tsiporah-fried.

[27] Mark Hvizda, Bryan Frederick, Alisa Laufer, Alexandra T. Evans, Kristen Gunness, and David A. Ochmanek, Dispersed, Disguised, and Degradable: The Implications of the Fighting in Ukraine for Future U.S.-Involved Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2025), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA3141-2.html; Stacie Pettyjohn, Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, February 8, 2024), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/evolution-not-revolution.

[28] Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, with Mason Clark, Karolina Hird, Nataliya Bugayova, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, and George Barros, Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, August 12, 2024), https://understandingwar.org/research/future-of-war/ukraine-and-the-problem-of-restoring-maneuver-in-contemporary-war/; Tsiporah Fried, The Impact of Drones on the Battlefield: Lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War from a French Perspective (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, November 13, 2025), https://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/impact-drones-battlefield-lessons-russian-ukraine-war-french-perspective-tsiporah-fried; Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo-Ukrainian War,” RUSI Special Resources (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, February 14, 2025), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/tactical-developments-during-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war; Perun, “Four Years of War in Ukraine—The Battlefield Balance, Losses & Counterattacks,” YouTube video, accessed March 6, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXmQIkV3SzU.

[29] NATO, Russian War Against Ukraine Lessons Curriculum Guide (NATO Headquarters, 2023), https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/iks/sharing%20public/231208-ruswar-ukraine-lessons-curriculum.pdf; Jack Watling, “Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine,” RUSI Insights Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, October 23, 2025), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/emergent-approaches-combined-arms-manoeuvre-ukraine; Perun, “Four Years of War in Ukraine—The Battlefield Balance, Losses & Counterattacks,” YouTube video, accessed March 6, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXmQIkV3SzU&t=1754s.

[30] Olena Bilousova, Kateryna Olkhovyk, and Lucas Risinger, From the Battlefield to the Future of Warfare: Harnessing Ukraine’s Drone Innovations to Advance U.S. Military Capabilities (Kyiv: KSE Institute, November 2025), https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/from-the-battlefield-to-the-future-of-warfare-harnessing-ukraine-s-drone-innovations-to-advance-u-s-military-capabilities-kse-institute-report/.

[31] Jack Watling, “Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine,” RUSI Insights Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, October 23, 2025), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/emergent-approaches-combined-arms-manoeuvre-ukraine; Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo–Ukrainian War,” RUSI Special Resources (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, February 14, 2025), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/tactical-developments-during-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war; Perun, “Four Years of War in Ukraine—The Battlefield Balance, Losses & Counterattacks,” YouTube video, accessed March 6, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXmQIkV3SzU.

[32] Perun, “Four Years of War in Ukraine—The Battlefield Balance, Losses & Counterattacks,” YouTube video, accessed March 12, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RXmQIkV3SzU.

[33] Thane C. Clare, A Navy of Necessity: Ukraine’s Unmanned Surface Vessels at War (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, November 25, 2025), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/a-navy-of-necessity-ukraines-unmanned-surface-vessels-at-war.

[34] Katie Livingstone, “Novel Interceptor Drones Bend Air-Defense Economics in Ukraine’s Favor,” Defense News, March 5, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/03/05/novel-interceptor-drones-bend-air-defense-economics-in-ukraines-favor/.

[35] Tim Sweijs, Élie Tenenbaum, and Jan Feldhusen, Lessons from the Jungle for the Zoo: Support Ukraine, Help Ourselves | Key Findings Ukraine Visit (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, February 5, 2026), https://hcss.nl/report/lessons-from-the-jungle-for-the-zoo/; Krzysztof Nieczypor and Sławomir Matuszak, “Game of Drones: The Production and Use of Ukrainian Battlefield Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” OSW Commentary (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, October 14, 2025), https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-10-14/game-drones-production-and-use-ukrainian-battlefield-unmanned.

[36] Tim Sweijs, Élie Tenenbaum, and Jan Feldhusen, Lessons from the Jungle for the Zoo: Support Ukraine, Help Ourselves | Key Findings Ukraine Visit (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, February 5, 2026), https://hcss.nl/report/lessons-from-the-jungle-for-the-zoo/.

[37] Tim Sweijs, Élie Tenenbaum, and Jan Feldhusen, Lessons from the Jungle for the Zoo: Support Ukraine, Help Ourselves | Key Findings Ukraine Visit (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, February 2026), https://hcss.nl/report/lessons-from-the-jungle-for-the-zoo/; Olena Bilousova, Kateryna Olkhovyk, and Lucas Risinger, From the Battlefield to the Future of Warfare: Harnessing Ukraine’s Drone Innovations to Advance U.S. Military Capabilities (Kyiv: KSE Institute, November 2025), https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/from-the-battlefield-to-the-future-of-warfare-harnessing-ukraine-s-drone-innovations-to-advance-u-s-military-capabilities-kse-institute-report/.

[38] Tim Sweijs, Élie Tenenbaum, and Jan Feldhusen, Lessons from the Jungle for the Zoo: Support Ukraine, Help Ourselves | Key Findings Ukraine Visit (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, February 5, 2026), https://hcss.nl/report/lessons-from-the-jungle-for-the-zoo/; Dominika Kunertova, Learning from the Ukrainian Battlefield: Tomorrow’s Drone Warfare, Today’s Innovation Challenge (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, August 2024), https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000690448; Dominika Kunertova, “The War in Ukraine Shows the Game-Changing Effect of Drones Depends on the Game,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 2 (2023): 95–102, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178180.

[39] Kateryna Bondar, Understanding the Military AI Ecosystem of Ukraine (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 12, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-military-ai-ecosystem-ukraine; Stefan Soesanto, The Ukrainian Way of Digital Warfighting: Volunteers, Applications, and Intelligence Sharing Platforms (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, July 2024), https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000685245.

[40] David Zikusoka, “How Ukraine’s ‘Uber for Artillery’ Is Leading the Software War Against Russia,” New America, May 25, 2023, https://www.newamerica.org/insights/how-ukraines-uber-for-artillery-is-leading-the-software-war-against-russia/; Emily Beaudoin, Muhammad Najjar, Liberty Potter, Jack Shanley, Shawn Singh, and David Sweeterman, Commercialized Combat: Analyzing Wartime Applications of Non-Military Technologies in the War in Ukraine (New York: Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, April 2023), https://www.sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/2023-05/For_Publication_NSIN_Bonfili.pdf.

[41] Stefan Soesanto, The Ukrainian Way of Digital Warfighting: Volunteers, Applications, and Intelligence Sharing Platforms (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, July 2024), https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000685245.

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