Physical attacks are serious threats to cryptosystems deployed in the real world. In this work, we propose a microarchitectural end-to-end attack methodology on generic lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms to recover the long-term secret key. Our attack targets a critical component of a Fujisaki-Okamoto transform that is used in the construction of almost all lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms. We demonstrate our attack model on practical schemes such as Kyber and Saber by using Rowhammer. We show that our attack is highly practical and imposes little preconditions on the attacker to succeed. As an additional contribution, we propose an improved version of the plaintext checking oracle, which is used by almost all physical attack strategies on lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanisms. Our improvement reduces the number of queries to the plaintext checking oracle by as much as $39\%$ for Saber and approximately $23\%$ for Kyber768. This can be of independent interest and can also be used to reduce the complexity of other attacks.

翻译：物理攻击是对部署在现实世界中的密码系统的严重威胁。本文提出一种针对通用格基后量子密钥封装机制的微架构端到端攻击方法，用于恢复长期密钥。我们的攻击瞄准了几乎所有格基密钥封装机制构造中使用的Fujisaki-Okamoto变换的关键组件。我们通过使用Rowhammer在Kyber和Saber等实用方案上演示了攻击模型，证明该攻击具有高度实用性且对攻击者的成功条件要求极低。作为额外贡献，我们提出了改进版明文检测预言机——该组件被几乎所有格基密钥封装机制的物理攻击策略采用。我们的改进使Saber的明文检测预言机查询次数减少高达39%，对Kyber768减少约23%。该成果不仅具有独立研究价值，还可用于降低其他攻击的复杂度。