Measures of allocation optimality differ significantly when distributing standard tradable goods in peaceful times and scarce resources in crises. While realistic markets offer asymptotic efficiency, they may not necessarily guarantee fair allocation desirable when distributing the critical resources. To achieve fairness, mechanisms often rely on a central authority, which may act inefficiently in times of need when swiftness and good organization are crucial. In this work, we study a hybrid trading system called Crisdis, introduced by Jedli\v{c}kov\'{a} et al., which combines fair allocation of buying rights with a market - leveraging the best of both worlds. A frustration of a buyer in Crisdis is defined as a difference between the amount of goods they are entitled to according to the assigned buying rights and the amount of goods they are able to acquire by trading. We define a Price of Anarchy (PoA) in this system as a conceptual analogue of the original definition in the context of frustration. Our main contribution is a study of PoA in realistic complex double-sided market mechanisms for Crisdis. The performed empirical analysis suggests that in contrast to market free of governmental interventions, the PoA in our system decreases.

翻译：在和平时期分配标准可贸易商品与危机时期分配稀缺资源时，分配最优性的衡量标准存在显著差异。尽管现实市场能提供渐近效率，但在分配关键资源时，它们未必能保证人们期望的公平分配。为实现公平，机制通常依赖中央权威，但在需要迅速和良好组织的紧急时刻，中央权威可能效率低下。本研究探讨了一种名为Crisdis的混合交易系统，由Jedli\v{c}kov\'{a}等人提出，该系统将购买权的公平分配与市场相结合——融合了二者的优点。在Crisdis中，买方的挫败感定义为根据分配购买权他们有权获得的商品数量与实际通过交易能够获得的商品数量之间的差异。我们将该系统中的无政府代价（PoA）定义为原定义在挫败感背景下的概念类比。我们的主要贡献是研究了Crisdis中现实复杂双边市场机制下的无政府代价。进行的实证分析表明，与无政府干预的市场相比，我们系统中的无政府代价有所下降。