The ``EIP-1599 algorithm'' is used by the Ethereum blockchain to assemble transactions into blocks. While prior work has studied it under the assumption that bidders are ``impatient'', we analyze it under the assumption that bidders are ``patient'', which better corresponds to the fact that unscheduled transactions remain in the mempool and can be scheduled at a later time. We show that with ``patient'' bidders, this algorithm produces schedules of near-optimal welfare, provided it is given a mild resource augmentation (that does not increase with the time horizon). We prove some generalizations of the basic theorem, establish lower bounds that rule out several candidate improvements and extensions, and propose several questions for future work.

翻译："EIP-1559算法"被以太坊区块链用于将交易打包进区块。先前研究均在投标者"无耐心"的假设下分析该算法，本文则在投标者"耐心"的假设下展开分析——这一假设更符合未确认交易持续驻留内存池并可延迟调度的实际情况。我们证明：在投标者具有"耐心"的条件下，若给予该算法适度的资源增强（其增强幅度不随时间范围增长），则其生成的调度方案能实现近乎最优的福利水平。本文证明了基础定理的若干推广形式，建立了排除若干改进与扩展方案的下界约束，并提出了若干值得未来研究的问题。